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Abstract
This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting.
In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a
sequential and arbitrary manner. Each request is associated with an agent who may act selfishly
to misreport the requirement and valuation of her request. The supplier charges payment from
agents whose requests are satisfied, but incurs a load-dependent supply cost. The goal is to design
an incentive compatible online mechanism, which determines not only the resource allocation of
each request, but also the payment of each agent, so as to (approximately) maximize the social
welfare (i.e., aggregate valuations minus supply cost). We study this problem under the framework
of competitive analysis. The major contribution of this paper is the development of a unified
approach that achieves the best-possible competitive ratios for setups with different supply costs.
Specifically, we show that when there is no supply cost or the supply cost function is linear, our
model is essentially a standard 0-1 knapsack problem, for which our approach achieves logarithmic
competitive ratios that match the state-of-the-art (which is optimal). For the more challenging
setup when the supply cost is strictly-convex, we provide online mechanisms, for the first time,
that lead to the optimal competitive ratios as well. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
approach that unifies the characterization of optimal competitive ratios in online resource allocation
for different setups including zero, linear and strictly-convex supply costs.
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1 Introduction
We study the mechanism design for online resource allocation problems. A single supplier who allocates
capacity-limited resources (e.g., computing cycles, network bandwidth, energy, etc.) to requests that
arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. We consider a strategic setting where each request is
owned by a self-interested agent who may deliberately misreport the resource requirement and value of
the request. A request is satisfied if the required resource is allocated to the corresponding agent. The
supplier charges payment from agents whose requests are satisfied, and affords a supply cost which is
a function of the total resource allocated. The goal is to design not only the resource allocation of
each request, but also the payment of each agent, so that agents are well-incentivized to follow their
true preferences (i.e., incentive compatible [34]) and meanwhile, the social welfare (i.e., the aggregate
value minus the supply cost ) can be approximately maximized.
A prominent application of this model is the market-based resource allocation in cloud computing
[26]. Here, the resource may represent computing cycles that can run at different speeds. Cloud service
providers charge money from customers who purchase their services1, but must pay a considerable
amount of power and cooling cost to maintain their data centers. Moreover, such operational costs
are often load-dependent and is usually an increasing function of the total resource allocated (e.g.,
CPU). Another application of the investigated model may arise in the context of network routing with
congestion cost [15, 16, 4]. Each incoming user wants to own some pair of connections with a valuation
if any feasible connection is established. Congestion cost occurs when a link is occupied by multiple
users, and the cost can be modelled as a traffic-dependent increasing function [15, 2]. The target
is to maximize the total valuation of routed connections minus the congestion cost. In reality, such
congestion costs can either reflect the total energy needed to support the network, or simply a virtual
cost to penalize the degradation of the quality-of-service (e.g., latency [4, 16]). The authors of [2]
indicated that the power-rate curve for networking or computing devices (e.g., CPU, communication
links, and edge routers, etc) exhibit diseconomy-of-scale properties (i.e., a convex curve), and thus
polynomial functions are commonly used to model the power requirements of the network [15].
Motivated by the above applications, this paper primarily focuses on setups when the supply cost
function is strictly-convex and differentiable, i.e., the marginal cost is strictly increasing. A basic
challenge for online resource allocation in such setups is as follows: if the limited resource is allocated
too aggressively, then an excessive portion of the resource may be allocated to earlier requests with
low values. This will increase the total cost for the supplier and thus increase the payment for future
agents, which will consequently prevent the later agents from purchasing the resources even if their
valuations are higher than the earlier ones. On the other hand, if the payment is set too high, a
majority of the requests may be declined, leading to a poor performance as well. This paper aims to
tackle this challenge by designing an online mechanism that leads to the best-possible performance in
social welfare. More importantly, our optimal results for strictly-convex costs extend to setups with
no supply cost (i.e., zero cost) or linear supply cost, leading to a unified approach for online resource
allocation with zero, linear or strictly-convex supply costs.
1.1 Related Results
Different variants of online resource allocation problems have been studied in both the non-strategic
setting, e.g., [27, 19, 5, 13, 42, 38], and the strategic setting, e.g., [7, 8, 11, 25, 39].
1In practice, major cloud service providers such as Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud often
use fixed pricing schemes. However, dynamic pricing is also adopted under some circumstances. For example, customers
of Amazon EC2 Spot Instances (https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot/) are charged based on spot prices that are adjusted
in real-time. Typically, the spot prices are determined based on multiple factors such as long-term trend in demand and
supply of spot instance capacity.
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In the non-strategic setting, the main focus is to design online algorithms with a competitive
fraction of optimum. Classic problems in this stream of studies include online bipartite matching
[27], Adwords problems [19, 31, 32], online covering and packing problems [12, 13], online knapsack
problems [42, 41], and one-way trading problems [23]. For example, the authors of [32] introduced
the Adwords problem and characterized the optimal competitive ratio by assuming each bid is much
smaller than the total budget (i.e., the infinitesimal assumption). Similarly, the authors of [42] proved
that, when the weight of each item is much smaller than the capacity of the knapsack, and the value-to-
weight ratio of each item is bounded within [L,U ], no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio
tighter than 1 + ln(U/L). In addition to the above classic problems, new variants of online resource
allocation problems have also been reported, e.g., [5, 21, 28, 29]. For example, a generalization of the
online matching and Adwords problem was studied in [21], where each incoming agent has a concave
function representing the return or utility of this agent, in contrast to the budgeted linear utility
function studied by almost all previous online matching problems. In particular, the authors of [21]
derived a differential equation based on the primal-dual analysis, and then characterized the optimal
competitive ratio by analyzing the differential equation via variations of calculus. Lin et al. [28]
recently proposed an optimal online algorithm for a generalized one-way trading problem, where the
online decisions are made in each round to maximize the per-round concave revenue function under
inventory (budget) constraints. Recently, an extended online matching problem was presented by [29],
in which the items can be sold at multiple feasible prices instead of a single price. Based on this setup,
Ma et al. [29] designed an online algorithm with the best-possible competitive ratios that depend on
the sets of multiple prices given in advance.
In the strategic setting, agents are self-interested and thus a careful payment rule must be designed
along with the online allocation algorithms so as to guarantee the incentive compatibility. A classic
problem in this setting is the online combinatorial auction (CA) problem, e.g., [34, 6, 7, 11, 8, 25].
Existing studies studying the online CAs focus on two cases: one is with stringent supply constraints
(i.e., limited supply) and the other is unlimited supply, namely, the supplier can produce as many copies
of items as possible with no cost. For example, the authors of [7] studied an online CA problem and
proposed an O(log(vmax/vmin))-competitive online algorithm when there are Ω(log(vmax/vmin)) copies
of each item, where the customers’ valuation is assumed to be in the range of [vmin, vmax]. Considering
the shortcomings of both the limited-supply case and the unlimited-supply case in modelling real-world
problems, Blum et al. [8] studied online CAs in a more general case with increasing production cost.
In this case, the supplier can produce additional number of items while paying an increasing marginal
cost per copy2. Blum et al. proposed a pricing scheme called twice-the-index, and gave constant
competitive ratios for simple marginal cost functions such as linear and lower-degree polynomial.
Huang et al. [25] later studied a similar problem and achieved a tighter competitive ratio. In particular,
for polynomial cost functions f(y) = ys, Huang et al. [25] proved that an optimal s
s
s−1 -competitive
online mechanism can be designed when each agent buys infinitesimally small units of items. However,
the optimal competitive ratio in [25] was obtained without considering the capacity limits, and thus
the results cannot capture how the limited supply affects the optimal online mechanisms. Tan et
al. [39] later studied this problem with both polynomial supply costs f(y) = ys and stringent supply
constraints. When the valuation-to-demand ratio of agents (i.e., valuation divided by resource demand)
are upper bounded by p¯, Tan et al. [39] proved that the optimal competitive ratio s
s
s−1 which is firstly
characterized by [25] becomes non-achievable if p¯ exceeds a certain threshold. Moreover, this threshold
depends on the supply capacity. In this regard, the results in [25, 39] show that both the supply costs
and the supply constraints can influence the optimal competitive ratio.
2The limited-supply case can be considered a special case of the model in [8] with a 0-to-∞ step function representing
the marginal supply cost.
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1.2 Our Contributions and Techniques
In this paper, we consider a significant generalization of the online resource allocation problem by
allowing arbitrary strictly-convex supply costs and stringent supply constraints. In this setting, addi-
tional units of resources can be supplied at strictly-increasing marginal costs, and the total resource
allocated must stay within the capacity limit. To the best of our knowledge, characterizing the op-
timal competitive ratios in such settings is an open question. This paper fills this gap and proposes
an optimal online mechanism with the best-possible competitive ratios. Meanwhile, for some special
cases when the supply costs are not strictly-convex, e.g., zero and linear supply cost, we prove that
our design still holds (with some minor modifications) and achieves logarithmic competitive ratios
which have been proven as optimal by existing literature. Therefore, our proposed approach unifies
the characterization of optimal competitive ratios in online resource allocation for different setups
including zero, linear and strictly-convex supply costs.
Close to our work is the design of online primal-dual algorithms, e.g., [5, 12, 13, 21, 20, 25, 29, 24]
(in particular, see [14] for a comprehensive survey). The key is to construct a dual feasible objective
that is close to the primal feasible objective at each round when there is a new arrival of agent, and then
use weak duality to bound the performance of the online algorithm. In this paper, the construction
of feasible primal and dual solutions is based on a universal monotone “pricing function”, denoted
by φ, which is designed by solving an ordinary differential equation (ODE) [3]. Unlike techniques
adopted by [29, 25, 21], our derived ODE contains two boundary conditions imposed by the supply
constraints, and thus is essentially a two-point boundary value problem (BVP) [1, 3, 35]. We prove
that the existence of any α-competitive algorithm is equivalent to the existence of a strictly-increasing
solution to the BVP, for which the uniqueness and existence conditions are rigorously proved. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the design and analysis of online algorithms are
based on the existence and uniqueness of solutions to BVPs parameterized by the competitive ratios.
We believe that our proposed design principle sheds light on new directions for solving other online
optimization problems.
2 Problem Setup
In this section, we present the problem setup with the resource allocation model, and then introduce
the assumptions and definitions that will be used in our online mechanism design.
2.1 The Model
We consider a single supplier who allocates a single type of resource to a set of requests N =
{1, · · · , N}. Each request n ∈ N is owned by an agent (which is also indexed by n for simplicity), and
can be represented by a private type θn =
(
rn, vn
)
, where rn represents the resource requirement and
vn denotes the valuation of agent n if the request is satisfied. In practice, we can interpret vn as the
willingness-to-pay of agent n for obtaining the required resource.
Let us define a binary variable xn = {0, 1} for each request n ∈ N , and assume xn = 1 if request
n is satisfied and xn = 0 otherwise. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities [34], i.e., the
utility of agent n is denoted by Un = vnxn − pin, where pin denotes the payment made by agent n.
Intuitively, agents whose requests are not satisfied make zero payment, i.e., pin = 0 if xn = 0. The
supplier collects payment pin from agent n, and pays a total supply cost of f(
∑
n rnxn), where
∑
n rnxn
denotes the total resource allocated and f represents the supply cost function. Therefore, the utility
of the supplier (i.e., the profit) can be denoted by Us =
∑
n∈N pin − f(
∑
n rnxn). We consider limited
supply with a stringent capacity limit. Without loss of generality, we normalize the capacity limit
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to be 1, and thus
∑
n rnxn ≤ 1. Meanwhile, the requirements {rn}∀n denote the proportions of the
normalized capacity limit accordingly. Our mechanism design relies on some properties of the cost
function f , which is discussed later in Section 2.2.
We focus on social welfare maximization in an online setting, where agents arrive one-by-one in a
sequential and arbitrary manner, breaking ties arbitrarily. We denote the sequence of agent arrivals
by A , (θ1,θ2, · · · ,θN ), where we assume without loss of generality that the arrival times are in
ascending order. In the following we refer to A as the arrival instance. If we assume a complete
knowledge of A, then the social welfare maximization in the offline setting can be written as follows:
maximize
{xn}∀n
∑
n∈N
vnxn − f
(∑
n∈N
rnxn
)
(1a)
subject to
∑
n∈N
rnxn ≤ 1, (1b)
xn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N . (1c)
In Problem (1), the objective is the aggregate utilities of all the agents and the supplier, where the
payment terms cancel out.
Remark 1. If there is no supply cost, i.e., f = 0, then Problem (1) is a standard 0-1 knapsack problem
[42]. Meanwhile, if we consider allocation of bundles of resources with a supply cost function for each
type of resource, Problem (1) can be extended to model the standard online combinatorial auction
problem [34, 8]. Therefore, the studied model is a generalization of a variety of classic online resource
allocation problems. In this paper, we mainly focus on the basic model presented by Problem (1).
For discussions of extending our model to consider multiple types of resources, as well as generalizing
Problem (1) to model online resource allocation with multiple time slots (e.g., job scheduling in cloud
computing), please refer to Section 5.3.2.
2.2 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. For each request n ∈ N , the valuation density, defined as vn/rn, is lower and upper
bounded as follows:
¯
p ≤ vn
rn
≤ p¯, ∀n ∈ N . (2)
Assumption 1 is similar to the one in [42, 29, 7]. Specifically, one can interpret
¯
p as the lowest
selling price per unit of resource, which is set by the supplier in advance. Thus, the request of any
agent with a valuation density lower than
¯
p will automatically be rejected. In comparison, the upper
bound p¯ can be considered an inherent attribute of the arrival instance with rational agents, and in
reality it exists naturally.
Assumption 2. The resource requirement of each request is very small compared to the total capacity
limit, i.e., rn  1,∀n ∈ N .
Assumption 2 is common in designing online algorithms, e.g., [32, 42, 25, 21], since it allows
us to focus on the infinitesimal nature of our problem with mathematical convenience. Meanwhile,
Assumption 2 is reasonable in many real-world large-scale systems.
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Definition 1 (Information Setup). We define all the information known to the supplier a priori as a
setup S, denoted by
S , {f,
¯
p, p¯}. (3)
In the following, we say S is a nice setup if f is monotonically non-decreasing with zero startup
cost (i.e, f(0) = 0) and satisfies f ′(0) <
¯
p ≤ p¯. Meanwhile, we refer to a nice setup S as a convex
setup if f is also strictly-convex and differentiable. Given a nice setup S, the supplier only knows the
information given by S, and does not know anything about the arrival instance A such as the total
number of requests (i.e., N).
2.3 Definitions
Below we give some definitions regarding incentive compatibility, online mechanisms, and competitive
ratios.
(Incentive Compatibility) We consider the design of direct revelation mechanisms under a
strategic setting, where each agent n ∈ N participates by declaring the type θˆn = (rˆn, vˆn) at time aˆn.
Since agents are self-interested, the reported preference θˆn of agent n ∈ N may or may not be her
true preference θn. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if all agents achieve the best outcomes
(i.e., the maximum utilities) by acting according to their true preferences.
(Online Mechanism) Given a convex setup S, we aim to design an IC online mechanism to
(approximately) maximize the social welfare. In the online setting, agents arrive one-by-one in a
sequential order (where ties are broken arbitrarily). At each round when there is a new arrival of
agent n ∈ N , the supplier needs to make two types of irrevocable decisions as follows: i) the allocation
rule, namely the decisions about whether request n should be satisfied or not (i.e., xn); and ii) the
payment rule, namely, how much money should be charged from agent n if the request is satisfied.
The resource allocation rule and the payment rule constitute an online mechanism. In the strategic
setting, agents may deliberately misreport their type information to be better off, and thus the supplier
needs to carefully design the payment rule such that agents are well-incentivized to follow their true
preferences3.
(Competitive Ratio) The performance of an online mechanism can be quantified by the standard
competitive analysis framework [9]. Given an arrival instanceA, let us denote the optimal social welfare
by Soffline(A), which is the optimal objective value of Problem (1) in the offline setting. Let Sonline(A)
denote the social welfare achieved by an online mechanism based on the knowledge of S only. The
competitive ratio of an online mechanism is defined as
α , max
all possible A
Soffline(A)
Sonline(A) , (4)
where α ≥ 1 and the closer to 1 the better. Note that in the online setting the supplier does not
known any future information except S, and thus the competitive ratio α should depend on S only.
Our target is to design an IC online mechanism such that Sonline(A) is as close to Soffline(A) as
possible for all possible A’s, namely, an online mechanism with an competitive ratio that is as small as
possible. To define how small the competitive ratio could possible be, we give the following definition
regarding the optimal competitive ratio for a given nice setup S.
3In a non-strategic environment, only an allocation rule is needed, and thus in this case an online mechanism is simply
an online algorithm.
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Definition 2 (Optimal Competitive Ratio). A competitive ratio is optimal if no other online algo-
rithms can achieve a smaller one under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. In particular, given a nice
setup S, the optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) is defined as
α∗(S) , inf max
all possible A
Soffline(A)
Sonline(A) , (5)
where the inf operator is taken w.r.t. all possible online algorithms.
3 Online Mechanism Design
This section presents our proposed online mechanism. We start by giving some preliminaries and
notations regarding the primal and dual of Problem (1), and then describe the design principle and
design procedures of our online mechanism.
Table 1: Notations
Symbol Description
vn value of agent n
xn binary decision variable of agent n
rn resource requirement of agent n
f supply cost function
¯
p (p¯) lower (upper) bound of vn/rn
¯
c (c¯) minimum (maximum) marginal cost
¯
ρ (ρ¯) maximum resource utilization when vnrn = ¯
p (p¯), ∀n
φ(y) pricing function with three segments
ϕ(y) increasing segment of φ(y) when y ∈ [ω, ρ¯]
ω resource utilization threshold so that φ(ω) =
¯
c
u resource utilization threshold so that φ(u) = c¯
pˆin final payment made by agent n
pˆn posted price for agent n+ 1
yˆn total resource utilization after agent n
3.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce some notations to help derive the dual of Problem (1). Given a convex setup S, we
define
¯
c and c¯ as follows:
¯
c , f ′(0), c¯ , f ′(1), (6)
where
¯
c and c¯ denote the minimum and maximum marginal cost, respectively. Based on the capacity
limit, we define the extended cost function f¯(y) as follows:
f¯(y) =
{
f(y) if y ∈ [0, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞), (7)
which extends the domain of f(y) to all y ∈ [0,+∞). Based on the extended cost function f¯ , we define
Fp(y) as follows:
Fp(y) , py − f¯(y), y ∈ [0,+∞), (8)
which represents the profit of selling y units of resources at price p, where py represents the revenue
and f¯(y) represents the supply cost. In the following, Fp(y) is referred to as the profit function.
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(Relaxed Primal Problem) Our online mechanism is designed based on a principled primal-dual
analysis of Problem (1). We consider the following relaxed welfare maximization problem
maximize
x,y
∑
n∈N
vnxn − f¯(y) (9a)
subject to
∑
n∈N
rnxn ≤ y, (p) (9b)
xn ≤ 1,∀n ∈ N , (γn) (9c)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, (9d)
where x = {xn}∀n. In Problem (9), (p, γn) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the corre-
sponding constraint.
When f is non-decreasing, Problem (9) is equivalent to Problem (1) except the relaxation of
{xn}∀n. The reason is as follows. First, compared to the original cost function f with the capacity
limit constraint (1b), the introduction of f¯ in Problem (9) is an equivalent transformation. Second,
the relaxation of the equality constraint (1b) to an inequality one in Eq. (9b) is lossless since the
inequality will always be binding when f is non-decreasing.
(Dual Problem) Problem (9) is a continuous optimization problem, whose dual can be expressed
as follows:
minimize
p,γ
∑
n∈N
γn + h (p) (10a)
subject to γn ≥ vn − prn, ∀n ∈ N , (10b)
p ≥ 0,γ ≥ 0, (10c)
where γ = {γn}∀n. We interpret p as the price per unit of resource, and γn as the utility of agent n.
In Eq. (10a), h(p) is given by
h(p) = max
y≥0
py − f¯(y) = max
y≥0
Fp(y), (11)
which can be written as follows:
h(p) =
{
Fp
(
f ′−1(p)
)
if p ∈ [
¯
c, c¯],
Fp
(
1
)
if p ∈ (c¯,+∞). (12)
The above function h(p) is known as the convex conjugate of f¯ [10]. An economic interpretation
of Eq. (11) is that h(p) represents the optimal profit when the selling price is p, where py represents
the revenue and f¯(y) represents the supply cost. In this regard, the dual objective in Eq. (10a) is the
aggregate utilities of all the agents plus the utility of the supplier (i.e., the profit). In comparison, the
primal objective in Eq. (9) is the aggregate values of all the satisfied requests minus the supply cost.
Both of them represent the social welfare of the system.
Given an arrival instance A, let us denote the optimal primal objective of Problem (9) by P∗(A).
Similarly, denote by D∗(A) the optimal dual objective of Problem (10). Then, we have
Soffline(A) ≤ P∗(A) ≤ D∗(A), (13)
where the first inequality is due to the relaxation of {xn}∀n and the second one is because of weak
duality4.
4Note that when f is convex, strong duality holds here, i.e., P∗(A) = D∗(A). However, throughout the paper we do
not need the strong duality.
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3.2 Design Principles
In the online setting, we need to process agents in a sequential manner. For a given arrival instance
A, after processing the n-th request, we denote the objective values of Problem (9) and Problem (10)
by Pn(A) and Dn(A), respectively. For simplicity, we drop the parenthesis and simply write Pn and
Dn hereinafter. Meanwhile, we say that Pn (Dn) is feasible if Pn (Dn) is a feasible objective value of
Problem (1) (Problem (10)) after processing the n-th request. Proposition 1 below shows that if the
sequences of {Pn}∀n and {Dn}∀n are feasible and satisfy a group of inequalities parameterized by α,
then the corresponding online algorithm is guaranteed to be α-competitive.
Proposition 1. An online algorithm is α-competitive if the following two conditions are satisfied,
namely, i) the sequences of {Pn}∀n and {Dn}∀n are feasible, and ii) there exists an index k ∈ N such
that the following inequalities hold{
Pk ≥ 1αDk,
Pn − Pn−1 ≥ 1α (Dn −Dn−1) , ∀n ∈ {k + 1, · · · , N}.
(14)
Proof. The feasibility of {Pn}∀n is trivial since any online algorithm must first produce a feasible
solution to the original problem in Eq. (1). We next show how the feasibility of {Dn}∀n and the
inequalities in Eq. (14) lead to an α-competitive online algorithm. Note that it suffices to prove
PN ≥ 1αDN since
Sonline = PN ≥ 1
α
DN
(i)
≥ 1
α
D∗
(ii)
≥ 1
α
P∗
(iii)
≥ 1
α
Soffline, (15)
where inequalities (ii) and (iii) directly follow Eq. (13), and inequality (i) holds since DN is a feasible
objective value of Problem (10), while D∗ is the optimum (minimum).
Suppose there exists an index k ∈ N such that the second inequality in Eq. (14) hold for all
n ∈ {k + 1, · · · , N}, then
PN − Pk =
N∑
n=k+1
(Pn − Pn−1) ≥ 1
α
N∑
n=k+1
(Dn −Dn−1) = 1
α
(DN −Dk),
which leads to PN ≥ 1αDN after substituting Pk ≥ 1αDk into the above equation. We thus complete
the proof.
We refer to the first inequality in Eq. (14) as the initial inequality, and the second one in Eq. (14)
as the incremental inequality. Note that when P0 = D0 = 0 and k = 1, the two types of inequalities
can be combined. Proposition 1 in this case simply follows the standard online primal-dual approach
[14]. In this regard, Proposition 1 is a more general principle for designing online algorithms.
3.3 Posted Price Mechanism
Our online mechanism is designed based on Proposition 1. The key idea is to construct a set of
feasible primal and dual solutions at each round when there is a new arrival of request n ∈ N , and
then guarantee that the resulting sequences of {Pn}∀n and {Dn}∀n satisfy the inequalities in Eq. (14).
(A Two-Step Design) Note that the dual variables {γn}∀n in Problem (10) are associated with
each individual agent, while p is a global one couples all the agents. Once the final price p is known
to the supplier, we can easily decouple different agents and design feasible primal and dual solutions
for each individual request n ∈ N . However, when there is no future information, it is impossible to
know the exact value of p a priori. Our idea is to adopt a two-step design procedures as follows:
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• Step-1: design a trajectory of {pˆn}∀n, where pˆn denotes the supplier’s prediction of the final
price p after processing agent n.
• Step-2: when there is a new arrival of request n ∈ N , based on pˆn−1, perform the following
decision-making:
– Set the dual variable γˆn by
γˆn = max
{
vn − pˆn−1rn, 0
}
, ∀n ∈ N . (16)
– Set the primal variable xˆn by:
xˆn =
{
0 if vn − pˆn−1rn < 0,
1 if vn − pˆn−1rn ≥ 0 and yˆn−1 + rn ≤ 1,
where yˆn−1 denotes the total resource utilization after processing agent n − 1. Intuitively,
we have yˆ0 = 0.
– Set the final payment pˆin for agent n by
pˆin = pˆn−1rnxˆn, (17)
– Update the total resource utilization by
yˆn = yˆn−1 + rnxˆn. (18)
Based on the above two-step design procedure, the terminal value of the total resource utilization
is yˆN , and the terminal value of the predicted final price is pˆN . Together with {xˆn}∀n and {γˆn}∀n,
these variables constitute a complete set of online primal and dual solutions, which are denoted by VP
and VD as follows:
VP , ({xˆn}∀n, yˆN ) ,VD ,
(
pˆN , {γˆn}∀n
)
.
Note that to differentiate between offline and online settings, we place a hat on top of variables that
denote the decisions made online.
(Pricing Function in Step-1) To enable an online implementation, the price predictions in
Step-1 must be performed based on causal information only. One natural way of designing such price
predictions (without future information) is to relate pˆn to the current total resource utilization as
follows:
pˆn = φ (yˆn) ,∀n ∈ N , (19)
where yˆn denotes the total resource utilization after allocating the required resources to request n.
Based on our interpretation of pˆn, φ is referred to as the pricing function hereinafter. Eq. (19)
indicates that our prediction of the final price will be updated whenever the total resource utilization
changes.
(Posted Price Mechanism: PMφ) The above two-step design indicates that the pricing function
φ plays an important role in influencing VP and VD, as well as the sequences of {Pn}∀n and {Dn}∀n.
Therefore, the design of φ is directly related to the inequalities in Proposition 1, and thus determines
the competitive ratio of the online mechanism described above. The techniques of how to design φ in
Step-1 constitute the major results of this paper, and the details are deferred to Section 4. In the
following, we temporarily assume that the pricing function φ is given and summarize our proposed
online mechanism in Algorithm 1, dubbed PMφ.
An interesting observation about PMφ is that it can be implemented in a posted price manner.
Unlike auctions [37, 18, 34], the supplier running posted price [40, 22] simply publishes the selling
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price (i.e., line 4) and does not collect any information from the agents. The decisions are made by
each individual agent in the manner of take-it-or-leave-it (i.e., line 5-line 14). By virtue of posted-
price mechanisms [17, 40, 22], PMφ is IC, privacy-preserving and computationally-efficient. Therefore,
we argue that this is an extra advantage of our design, although we do not commit to posted price
mechanisms a priori.
Algorithm 1: Posted Price Mechanism (PMφ)
1: Inputs: A given setup S = {f,
¯
p, p¯} and φ.
2: Initialize: yˆ0 = 0 and pˆ0 = φ(yˆ0).
3: while a new agent n arrives do
4: Supplier publishes the price pˆn−1.
5: if vn − pˆn−1rn < 0 then
6: Agent n leaves (i.e., set xˆn = 0)
7: else if yˆn−1 + rn > 1 then
8: Request n is rejected (i.e., set xˆn = 0)
9: else
10: Request n is satisfied (i.e., set xˆn = 1)
11: Collect the payment pˆin by Eq. (17).
12: Update the total resource utilization by Eq. (18).
13: Update the price by pˆn = φ(yˆn).
14: end if
15: end while
(Feasibility and Rationality of PMφ) As shown by Proposition 1, the feasibility of VP and VD
is crucial to prove the competitive ratio of the designed online mechanism. In Proposition 2 below,
we show that our above design of VP and VD is feasible as long as φ is monotone.
Proposition 2. The primal solutions in VP are always feasible to Problem (1) and Problem (9). The
dual solutions in VD are feasible to Problem (10) as long as φ is monotonically non-decreasing.
Proof. It is obvious that the design of ({xˆn}∀n, yˆN ) in VP are feasible to Problem (1). For each agent
n ∈ N , our design of γˆn in Eq. (16) indicates that γˆn ≥ vn − pˆn−1rn. If φ is non-decreasing, we have
pˆn−1 ≤ pˆn ≤ pˆN , ∀n ∈ N . Therefore, we have γˆn ≥ vn − pˆNrn holds for all n ∈ N . We thus complete
the proof.
Before leaving this section, it is worth mentioning that in economics and game theory [30, 34],
our design of a dual feasible γˆn in Eq. (16) is known to guarantee the individual rationality of the
mechanism, namely, no agent suffers from negative utility by participating in the mechanism (i.e., line
6 in Algorithm 1). Note that the individual rationality is also equivalent to saying that no agent is
forced to participate in the mechanism.
4 Main Results and Techniques
Proposition 2 shows that our previous design of VP and VD is feasible if the pricing function φ is
monotone. In this section, we present our major results regarding Step-1, namely, the design of a
monotone pricing function φ so that PMφ achieves a competitive performance in social welfare.
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4.1 Sufficient Conditions
To aid our following presentation, let us define
¯
ρ and ρ¯ as follows:
¯
ρ , arg max
y≥0 ¯
py − f¯(y), ρ¯ , arg max
y≥0
p¯y − f¯(y). (20)
For a convex setup when f¯(y) is strictly-convex and differentiable in y ∈ [0, 1],
¯
ρ and ρ¯ can be
respectively written as:
¯
ρ =
{
f ′−1
(
¯
p
)
if
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c, c¯),
1 if
¯
p ≥ c¯, ; ρ¯ =
{
f ′−1 (p¯) if p¯ ∈ (
¯
c, c¯),
1 if p¯ ≥ c¯.
The definitions of
¯
ρ and ρ¯ can be interpreted as follows. Suppose there are infinitely-many identical
agents whose valuation densities are all
¯
p (p¯), then the maximum (optimal) resource utilization level
is
¯
ρ (ρ¯). Both
¯
ρ and ρ¯ are capped by 1 due to the capacity limit.
Based on the above definitions of
¯
ρ and ρ¯, we next give Theorem 1 which shows the sufficient
conditions for φ so that PMφ is IC and achieves a bounded competitive ratio.
Theorem 1. Given a convex setup S, PMφ is IC and α-competitive if φ is given by
φ(y) =
¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω),
ϕ(y) if y ∈ [ω, ρ¯],
+∞ if y ∈ (ρ¯,+∞),
(21)
where ω is a resource utilization threshold that satisfies
F
¯
p(ω) ≥ 1
α
h
(
¯
p
)
and 0 ≤ ω ≤
¯
ρ, (22)
and ϕ(y) is an increasing function that satisfies{
ϕ′(y) ≤ α · ϕ(y)−f ′(y)h′(ϕ(y)) , y ∈ (ω, ρ¯);
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯. (23)
In Eq. (22), F
¯
p is the profit function defined in Eq. (8) and h is given by Eq. (11). In Eq. (23), h
′
represents the derivative of h.
Theorem 1 shows that PMφ with any pricing function given by Eq. (21) is IC and α-competitive,
provided that ω and ϕ satisfy certain conditions. The sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 are derived
based on Proposition 1. In particular, Eq. (22) and Eq. (23) correspond to the initial inequality and
the incremental inequality in Eq. (14), respectively. A rigorous proof is given in Appendix A, while
discussions of intuitions are given in Section 5.
We note that a pricing function φ given by Eq. (21) consists of three segments, namely, the flat-
segment [0, ω], the increasing-segment [ω, ρ¯], and the infinite-segment (ρ¯,+∞). Since ω is a resource
utilization threshold that separates the first two segments, and plays a critical role in shaping the
curvature of φ, we refer to ω as the critical threshold hereinafter. Recall that the valuation densities
of all the agents are lower bounded by
¯
p, and thus the incoming requests will always be satisfied when
the total resource utilization is below ω, regardless of their valuations.
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4.2 Necessary Conditions
An interesting result proved by this paper is as follows: existence of a pricing function given by Eq.
(21) is not only sufficient to guarantee a bounded competitive ratio for PMφ, but also necessary to the
existence of any α-competitive online algorithm. The result is given by the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Given a convex setup S, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there must
exist a critical threshold ω which satisfies Eq. (22) so that the following claims hold simultaneously:
• There exists a case when the total resource utilization is ω and all the accepted agents have the
same valuation density
¯
p.
• There exists a strictly-increasing function ψ(p) that satisfies{
ψ′(p) = 1α · h
′(p)
p−f ′(ψ(p)) , p ∈ (
¯
p, p¯),
ψ(
¯
p) = ω, ψ(p¯) ≤ ρ¯. (24)
• There exists a strictly-increasing function ϕ(y) that satisfies
BVP(ω, α)
{
ϕ′(y) = α · ϕ(y)−f ′(y)h′(ϕ(y)) , y ∈ (ω, ρ¯),
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯. (25)
• ψ and ϕ are inverse to each other, i.e., ψ = ϕ−1 or ϕ = ψ−1.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is based on constructing a resource utilization level ω and a strictly-
increasing function ψ for any α-competitive online algorithm under two special arrival instances. The
complete proof is deferred to Appendix B.
The first necessary condition in Theorem 2 argues that the existence of a critical threshold ω is
directly related to the existence of any α-competitive algorithm. Therefore, selling the resource at the
lowest price
¯
p during [0, ω] is necessary for PMφ to achieve a bounded competitive ratio. Meanwhile,
the value of the critical threshold ω must stay within a certain range defined by Eq. (22).
The second and the third conditions in Theorem 2 are related to ODEs with two boundary con-
ditions, which are often termed as first-order two-point BVPs in mathematics [3, 36]. For a given
setup, Eq. (25) is related to the critical threshold ω and the competitive ratio α, and thus we refer
to Eq. (25) by BVP(ω, α) hereinafter. Note that BVP(ω, α) is equivalent to Eq. (23) after enforcing
the equality of the differential inequality. Meanwhile, the sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 only
require an increasing ϕ that satisfies Eq. (23), while a strictly-increasing ϕ is needed in Theorem 2 to
guarantee the existence of an arbitrary α-competitive online algorithm.
(Principles of Optimal Design) Based on Theorem 2, if we can find a competitive ratio param-
eter α such that
• for some ω that satisfies Eq. (22), we can find a strictly-increasing solution to BVP(ω, α);
• for all ω that satisfies Eq. (22), there exists no strictly-increasing solution to BVP(ω, α− ), ∀ > 0,
then this α must be the optimal (minimum) competitive ratio achievable by all online algorithms5.
In the next two subsections, we use this principle to characterize the optimal competitive ratios for
different setups.
5Note that the same design principle can also be applied for the BVP in Eq. (24). Here, we choose to deal with
BVP(ω, α) because in the following we need to compute ϕ as part of our pricing function φ.
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4.3 Optimal Designs for Convex Setups
Theorem 3 below characterizes the design of a pricing function to achieve the optimal competitive
ratio for a given convex setup.
Theorem 3. Given a convex setup S, there exists a unique optimal critical threshold ω∗ so that the
following claims hold:
• The optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) is given by
α∗(S) =
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
=
¯
pf ′−1(
¯
p)−f(f ′−1(
¯
p))
¯
pω∗−f(ω∗) if ¯
p ∈ (
¯
c, c¯),
¯
p−f(1)
¯
pω∗−f(ω∗) if ¯
p ∈ [c¯,+∞).
(26)
• There exists a unique optimal pricing function φ∗ given by
φ∗(y) =
¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω∗),
ϕ∗(y) if y ∈ [ω∗, ρ¯],
+∞ if y ∈ (ρ¯,+∞),
(27)
so that PMφ∗ is IC and α∗(S)-competitive. In Eq. (27), ϕ∗ is the unique strictly-increasing
solution to BVP(ω∗, α∗(S)).
Theorem 3 illustrates our major results regarding the convex setup, namely, the existence and
uniqueness of the optimal pricing function φ∗ so that PMφ∗ achieves the optimal competitive ratio
α∗(S). The proof of Theorem 3 is based on analyzing the solution structures of BVP(ω, α), and the
details are given in Section 6. We emphasize that Theorem 3 shows the existence and uniqueness of
the optimal critical threshold ω∗ without discussing how to quantify it. For the details about how to
calculate ω∗, please refer to Theorem 5 in Section 6 as well.
Corollary 1. Given a convex setup S, we have:
• α∗(S) is strictly decreasing in
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c, p¯] for a given p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞).
• α∗(S) is strictly increasing in p¯ ∈ [
¯
p,+∞) for a given
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c,+∞).
• α∗(S) = 1 and ω∗ =
¯
ρ when
¯
p = p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞).
In Eq. (26), α∗(S) explicitly depends on f and
¯
p, and implicitly depends on p¯ through the optimal
critical threshold ω∗. This leads to the monotonicity of α∗(S) w.r.t. to
¯
p and p¯ in Corollary 1. In
particular, the third bullet in Corollary 1 can be interpreted as follows: when
¯
p = p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞), the
agents are identical in terms of their valuation densities, and thus it makes no difference to know all
the future arrival information, i.e., α∗(S) = 1. The proof of Corollary 1 is deferred to Appendix H.
Before leaving this subsection, we give the following remark regarding the uniqueness of φ∗.
Remark 2 (Uniqueness). We emphasize that the property of uniqueness in Theorem 3 does not mean
that there exists only one α∗(S)-competitive online mechanism/algorithm. Instead, Theorem 3 only
argues that PMφ∗ can achieve the optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) with a unique pricing function φ∗.
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4.4 Optimal Designs for Linear Supply Costs
For a given convex setup S, Theorem 3 shows that the optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) and the optimal
pricing function φ∗ are directly related to the optimal critical threshold ω∗. It is worth emphasizing
that ω∗ is a design parameter which cannot be given in analytical forms, so does φ∗ (in fact, f itself
is arbitrary, and thus this is not surprising). Nevertheless, for some special cost functions, Corollary 2
below shows that logarithmic competitive ratios can be obtained via analytical designs of φ∗ and ω∗.
Corollary 2. Given a nice setup S = {f,
¯
p, p¯}, if the cost function f(y) = qy, where q ≥ 0, then there
exists a unique pricing function φ∗ given by
φ∗(y) =
¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω∗),(
¯
p− q) · exp (y/ω∗ − 1) + q if y ∈ [ω∗, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
(28)
such that PMφ∗ is IC and α∗(S)-competitive, where α∗(S) is given by
α∗(S) = 1 + ln
( p¯− q
¯
p− q
)
.
In Eq. (28), the optimal critical threshold ω∗ = 1α∗(S) .
We note that the logarithmic competitive ratios in Corollary 2 are not new and have been discussed
in the literature, e.g., [42]. Based on [42], such logarithmic competitive ratios are optimal, unless extra
assumptions are introduced. Here, based on our above sufficient and necessary conditions for convex
setups, we provide new proofs, which are simple and intuitive, for the results in Corollary 2. The
details about the proof are deferred to Appendix C.
Summarizing our results in Theorem 3 and Corollary 2, we argue that PMφ is a unified mechanism
for online resource allocation with or without supply costs. In particular, we obtain optimal competi-
tive ratios for different setups including zero cost (i.e, without supply cost, which corresponds to q = 0
in Corollary 2), linear cost, and strictly-convex cost.
5 Interpretation, Intuition and Generalization of Theorem 1
In this section, we give a geometric interpretation of Theorem 1 and discuss the intuitions of our geo-
metric interpretation via worst-case analysis. We also show that the sufficient conditions in Theorem
1 can be generalized in multiple directions.
5.1 A Geometric Interpretation of Theorem 1
Since φ(ρ¯) = ϕ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯, the highest-possible resource utilization level under PMφ is φ−1(p¯). Let us
denote the final resource utilization level under PMφ by ρ ∈ [0, φ−1(p¯)]. Intuitively, if ρ ∈ [0, ω], then
the decisions made by PMφ and its offline counterpart are the same as long as φ has the flat-segment
[0, ω], namely, both are to satisfy all the requests. Hence, if ρ ∈ [0, ω], the competitive ratio of PMφ is
1. We next focus on the more general case when ρ ∈ [ω, φ−1(p¯)].
For any ρ ∈ [ω, φ−1(p¯)], let us denote the final price by p = φ(ρ). The pricing function φ(y)
satisfying Eq. (23) indicates that for any given ρ ∈ [ω, φ−1(p¯)], we have∫ ρ
ω
(
φ(y)− f ′(y)) dy ≥ ∫ p
¯
p
1
α
h′ (φ(y)) dφ(y). (29)
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Figure 1: Illustration of a feasible pricing function φ. The parameter u is a resource utilization level
such that φ(u) = c¯.
Meanwhile, based on Eq. (22), we have
F
¯
p(ω) =
¯
pω − f(ω) ≥ 1
α
h(
¯
p), (30)
where F
¯
p(ω) is the profit function defined by Eq. (8). The combination of Eq. (29) and Eq. (30)
leads to the following condition
¯
pω +
∫ ρ
ω
φ(y)dy − f (ρ) ≥ 1
α
h(φ(ρ)). (31)
Eq. (31) must hold for all possible ρ’s, i.e., all ρ ∈ [ω, φ−1(p¯)], and thus we have the following
expression of α:
α = max
ρ∈[ω,φ−1(p¯)]
h(φ(ρ))
¯
pω +
∫ ρ
ω φ(y)dy − f (ρ)
. (32)
To illustrate the geometric meaning of Eq. (32), let us assume p¯ ≥ c¯ for simplicity. We illustrate
the geometric interpretation of Eq. (32) in Fig. 1. Specifically, Fig. 1(a) shows the case when
p = φ(ρ) ≤ c¯, i.e., ρ ∈ [ω, u], where u is a resource utilization level such that φ(u) = c¯ or equivalently,
u = φ−1(c¯); Fig. 1(b) shows the case when p = φ(ρ) > c¯, i.e., ρ ∈ [u, 1]. Based on the expression of
h(p) in Eq. (12), for both subfigures in Fig. 1, the area of the grey region and the two blue regions
(which is referred to as ‘grey+blue’) represents the numerator of the fraction in Eq. (32), while the
denominator is the area of the grey region only (which is referred to as ‘grey’). Therefore, based
on Eq. (32), an α-competitive PMφ is equivalent to a pricing function φ so that the ratio between
‘grey+blue’ and ‘grey’ is less than or equal to α for all possible ρ’s in [ω, φ−1(p¯)].
In summary, given a pricing function φ that satisfies the sufficient conditions in Theorem 1, when
the final resource utilization level ρ ∈ [0, ω], the competitive ratio of PMφ is 1; when ρ ∈ [ω, φ−1(p¯)],
the competitive ratio of PMφ equals the maximum ratio between ‘grey+blue’ and ‘grey’ for all ρ ∈
[ω, φ−1(p¯)]. Since there is no prior information of ρ, the competitive ratio of PMφ is dominated by the
latter case, leading to the expression of α in Eq. (32).
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5.2 Intuitions via Worst-Case Analysis
Our above analysis only visualizes the geometric meaning of Eq. (32), but reveals little intuition and
rationality about why the maximum ratio between ‘grey+blue’ and ‘grey’ determines the competitive
ratio of PMφ. Below we show that, Eq. (32) can be traced back to the original definition of α in Eq.
(4), based on which the rationality of Theorem 1 can be demonstrated by the performance of PMφ
under a special arrival instance in the worst-case scenario.
To be more specific, let us again focus on the case when the final resource utilization level under
PMφ is ρ ∈ [ω, ρ¯]. For any given ρ ∈ [ω, ρ¯], let us assume the interval [0, ρ] is discretized into K + B
blocks with each block ∆ long, i.e., ∆ = ρ/(K + B), where we assume ∆ is infinitesimally small.
Let us consider a special arrival instance, denoted by Aρ, which consists of three groups of agents
as follows: the first group of agents are similar to our construction of A
¯
p in Section 4.2, where we
have K identical agents with valuation density
¯
p and requirement ∆. Here, we assume K∆ = ω. The
second group of agents are indexed by b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , B}, and the third group of agents are also identical
and are indexed by i, where i = {1, 2, · · · , I} and I ≥ 1/∆. For each request b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , B} in the
second group, we assume the valuation of agent b is given by vb = φ(ω+ b∆) ·∆, where φ(ω+ b∆) and
∆ denote the valuation density of agent b and the resource requirement of her request, respectively.
Similarly, for each request i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I} in the third group, we assume the valuation of agent i is
given by vi = φ(ρ)∆, where φ(ρ) and ∆ denote the valuation density of agent i and the requirement
of her request, respectively.
Given an arrival instance Aρ with ρ ∈ [ω, ρ¯], let us denote p = φ(ρ). The optimal social welfare
in hindsight, denoted by Soffline(Aρ), is to reject all the requests in the first two groups but satisfy all
the requests in the third group until reaching the resource utilization level y, at which the marginal
cost equals either p (i.e., y = f ′−1(p)) or
¯
c (i.e., y = 1). Thus, Soffline(Aρ) is given by
Soffline(Aρ) =
{
pf ′−1(p)− f(f ′−1(p)) if p ∈ (
¯
c, c¯],
p− f(1) if p ∈ (c¯,+∞), (33)
which equals the numerator of the fraction in Eq. (32) based on the expression of h(p) in Eq. (11).
Note that I ≥ 1/∆ guarantees that the final resource utilization level y = f ′−1(p) or y = 1 can be
reached by the offline optimal strategy.
In comparison, given the arrival instance Aρ, our online mechanism PMφ will satisfy all the requests
in the first two groups and reject all in the third group. Thus, the social welfare is given by
Sonline(Aρ) =
¯
pK∆ +
B∑
b=1
φ(ω + b∆) ·∆− f (ρ) , (34)
which equals the denominator of the fraction in Eq. (32) since K∆ = ω and ∆ is infinitesimally small.
Based on (32)-(34), the competitive ratio of PMφ is given by
α = max
ρ∈[ω,ρ¯]
Soffline(Aρ)
Sonline(Aρ) = maxall possible A
Soffline(A)
Sonline(A) ,
where the second equality is from the original definition of α in Eq. (4). It becomes clear now that the
sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 lead to the expression of α in Eq. (32), which in principle captures
the worst-case performance ratio between the optimal strategy in hindsight and our proposed online
mechanism PMφ under a continuum of special arrival instances {Aρ}{∀ρ∈[ω,ρ¯]}. In this regard, the
arrival instance Aρ is not constructed randomly; it indeed captures the worst-case scenario in the
context.
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5.3 Generalizations of Theorem 1
5.3.1 General Increasing Pricing Functions
Based on Eq. (32), we can generalize Theorem 1 to the following Corollary 3 with a broader class of
competitive pricing functions.
Corollary 3. Given a convex setup S, if φ is given by
φ(y) =
¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω),
ϕ(y) if y ∈ [ω, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
(35)
where ω ∈ (0,
¯
ρ], and ϕ is increasing in [ω, 1] with ϕ(ω) =
¯
p and ϕ(1) ≥ c¯, then PMφ is IC and
α(ω, ϕ)-competitive, where α(ω, ϕ) is
α(ω, ϕ) = max
{
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω)
,
h(p¯)
¯
pω +
∫ ρ¯ϕ
ω ϕ(y)dy − f (ρ¯ϕ)
, max
ρ∈[ω,ρ¯ϕ]
h
(
ϕ(ρ)
)
¯
pω +
∫ ρ
ω ϕ(y)dy − f (ρ)
}
. (36)
In Eq. (36), ρ¯ϕ is the maximum resource utilization level defined as:
ρ¯ϕ ,
{
ϕ−1(p¯) if p¯ ≤ ϕ(1),
1 if p¯ > ϕ(1).
Corollary 3 argues that any continuous pricing function with a flat-segment and an increasing-
segment can lead to a bounded competitive ratio for PMφ. Recall that when ω = 0, our previous
necessary conditions in Theorem 2 argue that it is impossible to achieve a bounded competitive ratio.
This can be illustrated by Eq. (36), where the first term in the bracket is unbounded since F
¯
p(0) = 0.
Note that the third term in Eq. (36) is derived from Eq. (32). Meanwhile, when ϕ(1) ≥ p¯, the second
term in the bracket of Eq. (36) is not needed as it is contained by the third term. The proof of
Corollary 3 is given in Appendix D.
Remark 3. Based on Theorem 3 and Corollary 3, we argue that α∗(S) is the optimal solution to the
following optimization problem:
α∗(S) = minimize
ω,ϕ
α(ω, ϕ)
subject to ω ∈ [0,
¯
ρ],
ϕ′(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ [ω, 1],
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(1) ≥ c¯.
In this regard, our previous design of ω∗ and ϕ∗ in Theorem 3 essentially provides a method of solving
the above optimization problem in functional spaces.
5.3.2 Pricing Functions for Multiple Time Slots
Our mechanism also extends to more general settings when there exists multiple time slots. Specifically,
let us consider the following model:
maximize
x,y
∑
n∈N
vnxn −
∑
t∈T
f¯t(yt) (37a)
subject to
∑
n∈N
rtnxn = yt,∀t ∈ T , (37b)
xn ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N . (37c)
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In Problem (37), we consider a discrete time system and index different time slots by t ∈ T ,
{1, 2, · · · , T}. In Eq. (37a), the supply cost at t ∈ T is directly written as an extended cost function
f¯t, i.e., f¯t(y) = ft(y) if y ∈ [0, 1], and f¯t(y) = +∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞). In Eq. (37b), rtn denotes the
requirement of agent n at t ∈ Tn, where Tn represents the time duration of request n. We assume
rtn = 0 if t /∈ Tn and rtn > 0 if t ∈ Tn so that we can simply denote the resource requirement of
request n by {rtn}∀t∈T . Meanwhile, similar to our previous basic resource allocation model, each agent
n ∈ N can be represented by θn =
({rtn}∀t∈Tn , vn), where vn denotes the valuation of agent n if all
the requirements {rtn}∀t∈Tn are satisfied.
While most of our previous definitions and notations can be reused by simply adding a time index
t ∈ T , e.g., ht(p),
¯
ct, and c¯t, we redefine the lower and upper bounds of the valuation density by
min
n∈N :rtn 6=0
{vn
rtn
}
≥
¯
pt, max
n∈N :rtn 6=0
{vn
rtn
}
≤ p¯t, ∀t ∈ T ,
where
¯
pt and p¯t correspond to
¯
p and p¯ in Assumption 1, respectively. Based on
¯
pt and p¯t, we can
define
¯
ρt and ρ¯t in the similar way as
¯
ρ and ρ¯ in Eq. (20). Here we omit the details for brevity.
Following the principle discussed in Section 3.3, we can design a pricing function pˆ
(n)
t = φt(y
(n)
t )
for each time slot t ∈ T , where y(n)t denotes the total resource utilization after processing agent n,
similar to our definition of yˆn in Eq. (18). Based on the pricing functions {φt}∀t, we can set the utility
of agent n ∈ N by
γˆn = max
{
vn −
∑
t∈Tn
rtn · φt
(
y
(n−1)
t
)
, 0
}
,∀n ∈ N ,
where
∑
t∈Tn r
t
n · φt(y(n−1)t ) denotes the payment of agent n if γˆn > 0. The mechanism PMφ can thus
be generalized to a posted price mechanism PMφ with a vector of pricing functions φ , {φt}∀t.
Based on the above discussions, we give a generalized version of Theorem 1 in the following Theorem
4.
Theorem 4. Given a convex setup S = {ft,
¯
pt, p¯t}∀t, PMφ is IC and maxt{αt}-competitive if for each
t ∈ T , φt is given by
φt(y) =
¯
pt if y ∈ [0, ωt),
ϕt(y) if y ∈ [ωt, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
(38)
where ωt is the critical threshold that satisfies
F
¯
pt(ωt) ≥
1
αt
ht(
¯
pt) and 0 ≤ ωt ≤
¯
ρt, (39)
and ϕt(y) is an increasing function that satisfies{
ϕ′t(y) ≤ αt · ϕt(y)−f
′
t(y)
h′(ϕt(y)) , y ∈ (ωt, 1)
ϕt(ωt) =
¯
pt, ϕt(1) ≥ p¯t +
∑
tˆ∈T \{t} htˆ
(
p¯tˆ
)
.
(40)
Note that Eq. (40) is the same as Eq. (23) except the second boundary condition, which depends
on parameters related to all the time slots T . Our previous analysis regarding the basic resource
allocation model shows that the optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) depends on the boundary conditions
in Eq. (25). Therefore, in the case with multiple time slots, the final competitive ratio α = maxt{αt}
depends on |T | as well. For the proof of Theorem 4, as well as discussions of the properties of {φt}∀t
based on Theorem 4, please refer to Appendix I.
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Remark 4 (Applications in Cloud Computing). Problem (37) can be used to model the online resource
allocation in cloud computing [26, 41]. A cloud service provider allocates a single type of resources
(e.g., CPU) to a set of jobs N = {1, · · · , N} that arrive in a sequential order, and each job n ∈ N is
active in duration Tn ⊂ T . Based on this interpretation, Problem (37) can be regarded as maximizing
the social welfare of online resource allocation in cloud computing with server costs (e.g., energy costs).
In particular, the arrival and departure times of job n can be taken into account by Tn, and agents are
flexible to set their resource requirements in each time slot based on the length of their active durations.
We end this section with the following remark regarding the setting with multiple types of resources.
Remark 5 (Multiple Types of Resources). Problem (37) can also be interpreted in the context of
resource allocation with multiple types of resources. Specifically, we can consider that in each time slot
we have a different type of resource so that T denotes the set of resource types. Based on this notational
system, rtn denotes the resource requirement of agent n for resource type t, and Tn represents the set of
resource types required by agent n. For this reason, it is mathematically equivalent to consider multiple
types of resources and multiple time slots. In addition, we can also consider the setup with multiple
resource types and multiple time slots simultaneously. We argue that our previous design principle still
applies to such more general and complex setups. The difference is that we need to design a pricing
function for each type of resource at each time slot6.
6 Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 3. Our proof is organized in three cases based on
the relationship between
¯
c, c¯,
¯
p, and p¯. After the proof, we give an example (quadratic supply cost
f(y) = 12y
2) to show the calculation of α∗(S), the optimal critical threshold ω∗, and the optimal
pricing function φ∗.
6.1 Overview of Our Three-Case Proof
Our proof heavily follows the sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 and the necessary conditions in
Theorem 2. For the sake of better reference, here we revisit BVP(ω, α) as follows:
BVP(ω, α)
{
ϕ′(y) = α · ϕ(y)−f ′(y)h′(ϕ(y)) , y ∈ (ω, ρ¯),
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯. (41)
Based on the expression of h in Eq. (11), the denominator of the ODE in Eq. (41) can be written
as
h′ (ϕ(y)) =
{
f ′−1 (ϕ(y)) if ϕ(y) ∈ [
¯
c, c¯],
1 if ϕ(y) ∈ (c¯,+∞), (42)
Eq. (42) indicates that the ODE in Eq. (41) can be equivalently transformed into two ODEs based
on whether ϕ(y) is larger than c¯ or not. Moreover, notice that the second boundary condition of
BVP(ω, α) is ϕ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯, where p¯ can be either less than or larger than c¯. For this reason, based on the
values of
¯
p and p¯, as well as the two boundary conditions in Eq. (41), we can categorize the whole
possibilities into three cases as follows.
• Case-1:
¯
c <
¯
p < c¯ < p¯. This case captures the setup when the minimum valuation density is
small but the maximum valuation density is large.
6The rationality is that in the worst case agents may only require a single type of resource at a single time slot.
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Figure 2: Category of the three cases for a given setup and illustrations of the optimal pricing functions
in the three cases.
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• Case-2:
¯
c < c¯ ≤
¯
p ≤ p¯. This case captures the setup when the minimum valuation density is
large.
• Case-3:
¯
c <
¯
p ≤ p¯ ≤ c¯. This case captures the setup when the maximum valuation density is
small.
We illustrate the above three cases in Fig. 2(a). A nice setup S must have p¯ ≥
¯
p, and thus we
only focus on the upper-left triangular part. We next present our proof of Theorem 3 in Case-1. The
proofs of Theorem 3 in Case-2 and Case-3 are similar and thus are deferred to Appendix G.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3 in Case-1
In this case,
¯
p < c¯ < p¯ indicates that
¯
ρ < 1 = ρ¯. Based on the two boundary conditions in Eq. (41),
there must exist a resource utilization threshold u ∈ (ω, 1) so that φ(u) = c¯, as illustrated in Fig.
1(b). Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we give the following Corollary 4 which summarizes the
sufficient and necessary conditions in Case-1.
Corollary 4. Given a convex setup S in Case-1, PMφ is IC and α-competitive if there exists a pair
of resource utilization thresholds (ω, u) ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
,
¯
ρ]× (ω, 1) such that φ is given by
φ(y) =

¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω],
ϕ1(y) if y ∈ [ω, u],
ϕ2(y) if y ∈ [u, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
(43)
where ϕ1(y) is a solution to the following BVP:
BVP1(ω, u, α)
{
ϕ′1(y) = α · ϕ1(y)−f
′(y)
f ′−1(ϕ1(y)) , y ∈ (ω, u);
ϕ1(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ1(u) = c¯,
(44)
and ϕ2(y) is a solution to the following BVP:
BVP2(u, α)
{
ϕ′2(y) = α · (ϕ2(y)− f ′(y)) , y ∈ (u, 1);
ϕ2(u) = c¯, ϕ2(1) ≥ p¯.
(45)
On the other hand, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there must exist some pair
of (ω, u) ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh(
¯
p)
)
,
¯
ρ]× (ω, 1) such that BVP1(ω, u, α) and BVP2(u, α) are well-defined, and each
of them has a strictly-increasing solution.
In Corollary 4, F−1
¯
p represents the inverse
7 of the profit function F
¯
p defined in Eq. (8), and
F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
is derived from Eq. (22). The flat-segment [0, ω] of φ directly follows Theorem 1. The
two BVPs in Eq. (44) and Eq. (45), as well as their corresponding solutions ϕ1(y) and ϕ2(y), follow
Theorem 2 after substituting h′(ϕ(y)) from Eq. (42) into BVP(ω, α). The sufficiency and necessity of
Corollary 4 thus follow.
Corollary 4 not only shows how to justify whether a given pricing function is competitive or not,
but also argues that, to find the optimal competitive ratio, we simply need to find the minimum α so
that both BVP1(ω, u, α) and BVP2(u, α) have strictly-increasing solutions. Below we give Proposition
3 which shows the existence conditions of solutions to both BVP1(ω, u, α) and BVP2(u, α).
7Based on Eq. (8), F
¯
p(y) is strictly increasing in y ∈ [0,
¯
ρ] since f ′(y) ≤
¯
p holds for all y ∈ [0,
¯
ρ]. Thus, the inverse of
F
¯
p, denoted by F
−1
¯
p , is well-defined.
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Proposition 3. Given a convex setup S in Case-1, the following claims regarding BVP1(ω, u, α) and
BVP2(u, α) are true:
• For each given pair of (ω, u) ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
,
¯
ρ] × (ω, 1), there exists a well-defined function
Γ1(ω, u) so that BVP1(ω, u, α) has a unique strictly-increasing solution if and only if α =
Γ1(ω, u).
• For each given u ∈ (0, 1), BVP2(u, α) has a unique strictly-increasing solution if and only if
α ≥ Γ2(u), where Γ2(u) is the unique root to the following equation in variable Γ2:∫ 1
u
Γ2f
′(y)
exp(yΓ2)
dy =
p¯
exp(Γ2)
− c¯
exp(uΓ2)
. (46)
Moreover, for each given u ∈ (0, 1), when α = Γ2(u), the unique solution to BVP2(u, α) satisfies
ϕ2(1) = p¯.
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the two ODEs given in Eq. (44) and Eq. (45), and the
details are deferred to Appendix E. Based on the above Proposition 3, below we give the optimal
competitive ratio in Case-1.
Theorem 5. Given a convex setup S in Case-1, the optimal competitive ratio achievable by all online
algorithms is given by:
α∗(S) =
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
= Γ1(ω∗, u∗) = Γ2(u∗), (47)
where u∗ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique root that satisfies
Γ1
(
F−1
¯
p
(
h(
¯
p)
Γ2(u∗)
)
, u∗
)
= Γ2(u∗), (48)
and ω∗ ∈ [0,
¯
ρ] is given by
ω∗ = F−1
¯
p
(
h
(
¯
p
)
Γ2(u∗)
)
.
Meanwhile, PMφ∗ is α∗(S)-competitive if and only if φ∗ is given by Eq. (43) with (ω, u, α) = (ω∗, u∗, α∗(S)).
Moreover, we have φ∗(1) = p¯.
Proof. This theorem shows the unique existence of ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S). Based on these parameters,
we can calculate the unique optimal pricing function φ∗ based on Eq. (43). The proof of the unique
existence of ω∗ and u∗ is based on Proposition 3. For the detailed proof, please refer to Appendix
F.
Based on Theorem 5, Theorem 3 directly follows in Case-1. Due to space limitations, we defer
the proof of Theorem 3 in Case-2 and Case-3 to Appendix G.
Fig. 2(b) illustrates the optimal pricing function φ∗ in Case-1. We can see that in addition to
the flat-segment [0, ω∗], the increasing-segment is further divided into two parts, namely, [ω∗, u∗] and
[u∗, 1]. Meanwhile, Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 2(d) illustrate the optimal pricing functions in Case-2 and
Case-3, respectively. Note that by PMφ∗ , the highest-possible resource utilization levels in Case-1
and Case-2 are 1, while in Case-3 is ρ¯ and ρ¯ < 1. This is consistent with our definition of ρ¯ in Eq.
(20).
For all the three cases, the optimal pricing function φ∗ cannot be given in analytical forms. We
argue that the computation of ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S) is light-weight and can be performed efficiently via
various numerical methods such as bisection searching. More importantly, ω∗ and u∗ can be computed
offline before the start of PMφ. For more detailed discussions of how to quantify ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S),
please refer to Appendix J.
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6.3 An Example: Quadratic Supply Costs
To better show how to calculate ω∗, u∗, α∗(S), and φ∗ in Theorem 5, in this subsection we perform
a case study based on quadratic supply costs. Let us assume f(y) = 12y
2 (i.e., f ′(y) = y), and thus
¯
c = f ′(0) = 0 and c¯ = f ′(1) = 1. Based on the definitions of h and Fp in Section 3.1, we have
h(
¯
p) =
{
1
2
¯
p2 if p ∈ [
¯
c, c¯]
¯
p− 12 if p ∈ (c¯,+∞)
, F
¯
p(ω) =
¯
pω − 1
2
ω2.
Therefore, the lower bound of the critical threshold ω can be written as a function of α as F−1
¯
p (
1
αh(
¯
p)) =
¯
p
(
1−√1− 1/α).
We next show how to compute ω∗, u∗, α∗(S) in Case-1. When f ′(y) = y, BVP1(ω, u, α) in Eq.
(44) can be written as {
ϕ′1(y) = α · ϕ1(y)−yϕ1(y) , y ∈ (ω, u);
ϕ1(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ1(u) = 1.
(49)
The ODE in Eq. (49) can be solved by separation of variables [36]. Substituting the two boundary
conditions into the solution of the ODE in Eq. (49) leads to the following equation of α, ω, and u:∫ 1/u
¯
p/ω
−η
η2 − αη + αdη = ln
(u
ω
)
. (50)
Based on Proposition 3, Eq. (50) has a unique root in α ≥ 1 for each given pair of (ω, u) ∈
[F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
,
¯
ρ]× (ω, 1). Therefore, α = Γ1(ω, u) is well-defined through Eq. (50).
Similarly, BVP2(u, α) in Eq. (45) can be written as{
ϕ′2(y) = α · (ϕ2(y)− y) , y ∈ (u, 1);
ϕ2(u) = c¯, ϕ2(1) = p¯,
(51)
where the second boundary condition is written as an equality since the optimal design should have
φ∗(1) = p¯, as indicated by Theorem 5. Solving the ODE in Eq. (51) is elementary. Substituting the
two boundary conditions into the analytical solution of the ODE in Eq. (51) leads to the following
equation of α and u:
exp (α(1− u)) = α(1 + p¯) + 1
α(u+ c¯) + 1
. (52)
Based on Proposition 3, Eq. (52) has a unique root in α for each given u ∈ (0, 1), and thus α = Γ2(u)
is well defined through Eq. (52). Note that Eq. (52) is a simplification of Eq. (46) when f ′(y) = y.
Combining the above results, when f ′(y) = y, the calculation of ω∗, u∗ and α∗(S) (which is denoted
as α∗ below for simplicity) in Eq. (47) can be written as the following system of three equations:
ω∗ =
¯
p
(
1−
√
1− 1/α∗
)
, (53a)∫ 1/u∗
¯
p/ω∗
−η
η2 − α∗η + α∗dη = ln
(
u∗
ω∗
)
, (53b)
exp (α∗(1− u∗)) = α∗(1 + p¯) + 1
α∗(u∗ + 1) + 1
. (53c)
Based on Theorem 5, the above system of equations has a unique pair of solutions (ω∗, u∗, α∗). In
particular, the optimal competitive ratio for the quadratic cost setup can be written as
α∗(S) =
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
=
 ¯
p2
2
¯
pω∗−ω2∗ if p ∈ [¯c, c¯],
2
¯
p−1
2
¯
pω∗−ω2∗ if p ∈ (c¯,+∞).
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Case-3
Case-1
(a)
¯
p = 0.3
Case-2
(b)
¯
p = 1.1
Figure 3: Relationship between α∗(S) and p¯ when f(y) = 12y2.
Recall that for the linear cost setup in Corollary 2, α∗(S) = 1ω∗ .
When calculating the unique solution to Eq. (53), we can substitute ω∗ given by Eq. (53a) into
Eq. (53b), and then leverage the monotonicity of both sides of Eq. (53b) and Eq. (53c) to locate
the unique values of α∗ and u∗. Based on α∗ and u∗, the optimal critical threshold ω∗ can be easily
calculated based on Eq. (53a). Theorem 5 shows that the optimal pricing function φ∗ can be obtained
as long as ω∗, u∗ and α∗ are given. For example, in Case-1, we can solve BVP1(ω∗, u∗, α∗) in Eq. (49)
to get the optimal pricing function ϕ∗1 in the interval [ω∗, u∗], and solve BVP2(u∗, α∗) in Eq. (51) to
get the optimal pricing function ϕ∗2 in the interval [u∗, 1]. The complete optimal pricing function φ∗
(in Case-1) can thus be determined.
We numerically solve the system of equations in Eq. (53) and illustrate the relationship between
α∗ and p¯ in Fig. 3. Specifically, we fix
¯
p = 0.3 and vary p¯ from 0.3 to 7.1 in Fig. 3(a) so that our
parameter setting covers both Case-1 (i.e., p¯ > 1) and Case-3 (i.e., p¯ ≤ 1). Meanwhile, we fix
¯
p = 1.1
and vary p¯ from 1.1 to 12.1 in Fig. 3(b) to simulate Case-2 (i.e.,
¯
p ≥ 1). Fig. 3 shows that α∗(S) = 1
when p¯ =
¯
p, and is strictly increasing in p¯ ∈ [
¯
p,+∞). This validates our results in Corollary 1. Note
that the systems of equations for the calculation of α∗ in Case-2 and Case-3 are different from Eq.
(53). For the details, please refer to Appendix G.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We studied the mechanism design for general online resource allocation problems in the presence
of supply costs and capacity limits. In this setting, the supplier can produce additional units of
resources at increasing marginal cost, but with a stringent capacity limit; agents are strategic and
may deliberately misreport their preference to be better off. The major contribution of the paper
is the development of a unified incentive compatible online mechanism, with a principled method of
constructing a universal “pricing function”, that leads to the optimal competitive ratios for different
setups including zero, linear and strictly-convex supply costs.
One of the drawbacks of the current design is that the optimal competitive ratio, as well as other
key design parameters such as the optimal critical threshold ω∗, cannot be given in analytical forms.
This brings difficulty in analyzing the properties of the competitive ratio w.r.t. important system
parameters such as the lower and upper bounds of valuation densities (i.e.,
¯
p and p¯). It also remains
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unclear if there exists any analytical (and thus simple) pricing function so that the optimal competitive
ratio can be approximately achieved. Meanwhile, extending the proposed techniques to other online
optimization problems is also an interesting future direction.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
The sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 are derived based on Proposition 1. Specifically, we need to
prove that under PMφ, i) the sequences of {Pn}∀n and {Dn}∀n are feasible, and ii) there exists some
k ∈ N so that the initial inequality and the incremental inequality hold. Based on Proposition 2, the
feasibility of {Pn}∀n and {Dn}∀n are trivial since the pricing function φ given by Eq. (19) is monotone.
In the following we focus on the proof of the initial inequality and the incremental inequality.
(Initial Inequality) Let us assume ω =
∑k
n=1 rn, namely, k is the number of agents such that the
total resource allocated equals ω. In the following we prove that the initial inequality Pk ≥ 1αDk holds.
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Based on Eq. (22), ω is the resource utilization threshold such that F
¯
p(ω) =
¯
pω − f¯ (ω) ≥ 1αh(
¯
p).
Thus, we have
¯
p ·
(
k∑
n=1
rn
)
− f¯
(
k∑
n=1
rn
)
≥ 1
α
h(
¯
p),
Since α ≥ 1 and γˆn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N , the above inequality leads to the following one(
1− 1
α
) k∑
n=1
γˆn +
k∑
n=1¯
prn − f¯
(
k∑
n=1
rn
)
≥ 1
α
h(
¯
p).
The pricing function given by Eq. (19) indicates that the requirements of all the requests will be
satisfied as long as the resource utilization is below ω. For this reason, we have yˆk =
∑k
n=1 rn = ω,
which represents the total resource utilization after processing request k. Therefore, we have
k∑
n=1
γˆn +
k∑
n=1¯
prn − f¯(yˆk) ≥ 1
α
(
k∑
n=1
γˆn + h(
¯
p)
)
, (54)
Note that the left-hand-side of Eq. (54) is equal to Pk since
∑k
n=1 γˆn+
∑k
n=1
¯
prn− f¯(yˆk) =
∑k
n=1 vn−
f¯(yˆk) = Pk, where the first equality comes from vn = γˆn + pˆn−1rn = γˆn +
¯
prn. Here, pˆn−1 =
¯
p holds
for all n = {1, 2, · · · , k} because the posted prices for all these agents are
¯
p (i.e., the flat-segment).
Meanwhile, based on the objective of Problem (10), the terms inside the parenthesis of Eq. (54) equal
Dk, namely, Dk =
∑k
n=1 γˆn + h(
¯
p). Therefore, Eq. (54) indicates that Pk ≥ 1αDk holds. We thus
complete the proof of the initial inequality.
(Incremental Inequality) We now prove that the incremental inequality Pn−Pn−1 ≥ 1α (Dn −Dn−1)
holds for all n ∈ {k + 1, · · · , N}. Note that if agent n is rejected (i.e., the demand of agent
n is not satisfied), then Pn = Pn−1 and Dn = Dn−1. In this case, the incremental inequality
Pn − Pn−1 ≥ 1α (Dn −Dn−1) holds for all α ≥ 1. Therefore, in the following we only focus on
the case when the requirement of agent n is satisfied. Eq. (23) shows that the following differential
inequality holds
φ(yˆn−1)− f¯ ′(yˆn−1) ≥ 1
α
· h′(φ(yˆn−1)) · φ′(yˆn−1) (55)
for all yˆn−1 ∈ [ω, ρ¯). Since yˆn − yˆn−1 = rn, based on the Taylor series we have
f¯ (yˆn) = f¯ (yˆn−1) + f¯ ′ (yˆn−1) (yˆn − yˆn−1) +O(r2n),
h
(
φ(yˆn)
)
= h
(
φ(yˆn−1)
)
+ h′
(
φ(yˆn−1)
)(
φ(yˆn)− φ(yˆn−1)
)
+O
((
φ(yˆn)− φ(yˆn−1)
)2)
,
φ (yˆn) = φ (yˆn−1) + φ′ (yˆn−1) (yˆn − yˆn−1) +O(r2n).
Based on Eq. (55) and the above Taylor series, we have
φ (yˆn−1)− f¯ (yˆn)− f¯ (yˆn−1)
yˆn − yˆn−1 −O(rn)
≥ 1
α
·
(
h (φ (yˆn))− h (φ (yˆn−1))
φ (yˆn)− φ (yˆn−1) −O(rn)
)
·
(
φ (yˆn)− φ (yˆn−1)
yˆn − yˆn−1 −O(rn)
)
,
Assumption 2 states that rn is sufficiently small, i.e., rn → 0. Thus, the following inequality holds:
φ (yˆn−1) (yˆn − yˆn−1)−
(
f¯ (yˆn)− f¯ (yˆn−1)
) ≥ 1
α
(h (φ (yˆn))− h (φ (yˆn−1))) .
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Since γˆn ≥ 0 and 1− 1α ≥ 0, we have(
1− 1
α
)
γˆn +
(
φ(yˆn−1)(yˆn − yˆn−1)−
(
f¯(yˆn)− f¯(yˆn−1)
))
≥ 1
α
(h (φ (yˆn))− h (φ (yˆn−1))) , (56)
Note that after processing agent n, the change in the primal objective is given by Pn − Pn−1 =
vn −
(
f¯(yˆn)− f¯(yˆn−1)
)
= γˆn + φ(yˆn−1) (yˆn − yˆn−1)−
(
f¯(yˆn)− f¯(yˆn−1)
)
, where the second equality is
due to vn = γˆn + pˆn−1rn = γˆn + φ(yˆn−1)(yˆn − yˆn−1). Similarly, the change in the dual objective is
given by Dn − Dn−1 = γˆn + h(pˆn) − h(pˆn−1) = γˆn + h (φ (yˆn)) − h (φ (yˆn−1)). Therefore, Eq. (56)
indicates that the incremental inequality Pn−Pn−1 ≥ 1α (Dn −Dn−1) holds for all n ∈ {k+ 1, · · · , N}
when yˆn−1 ∈ [ω, ρ¯).
Note that we need to guarantee that the incremental inequality holds at each round for all yˆn−1 ∈
[ω, ρ¯], where ρ¯ represents the maximum resource utilization level. Therefore, we need to consider the
boundary condition of φ(y) when y = ρ¯. First, φ(ω) =
¯
p is obvious as the pricing function φ must be
continuous. Taking integration of both sides of Eq. (55) leads to∫ ρ
ω
φ(y)dy − f¯(ρ) + f¯(ω) ≥ 1
α
(
h
(
φ(ρ)
)− h(
¯
p
))
.
Meanwhile, based on the flat-segment, we have
¯
pω − f¯(ω) ≥ 1αh(
¯
p). Thus, we have
¯
pω +
∫ ρ
ω
φ(y)dy − f¯(ρ) ≥ 1
α
h
(
φ(ρ)
)
, (57)
which is the same as Eq. (31). When ρ = ρ¯, the above inequality also holds, and thus we have
¯
pω +
∫ ρ¯
ω
φ(y)dy − f(ρ¯) ≥ 1
α
h
(
φ(ρ¯)
)
. (58)
On the other hand, PMφ is α-competitive indicates that the following inequality must hold:
¯
pω +
∫ ρ¯
ω
φ(y)dy − f(ρ¯) ≥ 1
α
h(p¯). (59)
Therefore, if we have φ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯, then Eq. (58) guarantees that Eq. (59) always holds. This means, the
incremental inequality Pn − Pn−1 ≥ 1α (Dn −Dn−1) holds at each round for all yˆn−1 ∈ [ω, ρ¯] as long
as the pricing function satisfies{
φ(y)− f ′(y) ≥ 1α · h′ (φ(y)) · φ′(y), y ∈ (ω, ρ¯),
φ(ω) =
¯
p, φ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯.
We thus complete the proof of the incremental inequality in Eq. (23).
Summarizing our above proofs regarding the initial and incremental inequalities, we complete the
proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Our proof of Theorem 2 is organized as follows. We first give a set of less restrictive conditions in
Theorem 6, based on which we give Theorem 7 to show the existence of strictly-increasing allocation
functions and pricing functions. Based on Theorem 6 and Theorem 7, Theorem 2 directly follows.
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B.1 General Necessary Conditions
Theorem 6 below gives a set of necessary conditions to guarantee the existence of an α-competitive
online algorithm.
Theorem 6. Given a convex setup S, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there
must exist a parameter ω which satisfies
F
¯
p(ω) ≥ 1
α
h
(
¯
p
)
and 0 ≤ ω ≤
¯
ρ (60)
so that the following claims hold simultaneously:
• NC1): There exists a case when the total resource utilization is ω and all the accepted agents
have the same valuation density
¯
p.
• NC2): There exists a non-decreasing function ψ(p) that satisfies{
¯
pω +
∫ p
¯
p ηψ
′(η)dη − f(ψ(p)) ≥ 1αh (p) , p ∈ (
¯
p, p¯),
ψ
(
¯
p
)
= ω, ψ
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯, (61)
where ψ(p) is a monotone mapping from p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] to ψ(p) ∈ [ω, ρ¯].
Proof. The proof of this theorem is based on constructing a resource utilization level ω and a monotone
function ψ for any α-competitive online algorithm under two special arrival instances. We organize
our proofs of NC1 and NC2 as follows.
(Proof of NC1) By definition, an α-competitive online algorithm must achieve an online social
welfare that is no less than 1α of its offline counterpart for all possible arrival instances. To prove
this, we first construct an arrival instance A
¯
p as follows: there are K agents in A
¯
p with the same
valuation density
¯
p, and all the requests ask for resources with the same requirement ∆, where ∆ is
infinitely small and K∆ =
¯
ρ. Based on Eq. (20), the optimal offline strategy under this arrival
instance is to accept all the requests and the resulting optimal social welfare is given by Soffline(A
¯
p) =
K
¯
p∆ − f¯(K∆) =
¯
p ·
¯
ρ − f¯(
¯
ρ) = h(
¯
p). For any α-competitive online algorithm (including PMφ),
let us denote the final resource utilization level by ω ∈ [0, 1], then the online social welfare is given
by Sonline(A
¯
p) =
¯
pω − f¯(ω) = F
¯
p(ω). Based on Soffline(A
¯
p) and Sonline(A
¯
p), the online algorithm is
α-competitive indicates that Sonline(A
¯
p) = F
¯
p(ω) ≥ 1αSoffline(A
¯
p) =
1
αh
(
¯
p
)
. Meanwhile, ω must be
less than or equal to
¯
ρ since otherwise the marginal cost is larger than the valuation density
¯
p, i.e.,
ω ∈ [0,
¯
ρ]. Combining these results, we can conclude that under the arrival instance A
¯
p, if there is
an α-competitive online algorithm, then this algorithm must accept all the agents so that the total
resource utilization is ω. We thus complete the proof of NC1.
(Proof of NC2) Our proof of NC2 is based on constructing a special arrival instance Ap such that
any α-competitive online algorithm must satisfy the inequality in Eq. (61) in order to achieve at least
1
α of the offline optimal social welfare in hindsight. Specifically, for any p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], Ap is constructed
as follows. We assume that Ap consists of two groups of arrivals. First, there is a group of identical
agents whose valuation densities are
¯
p and the total resource requirements of these identical agents
are ω. In the following, we refer to the identical agents in this group by Group-(
¯
p, ω). Second, let us
assume for each η ∈ [
¯
p, p], there is a group of agents parameterized by η, where all the agents in group
η are identical and has a total requirement of h′(η) (i.e., each customer’s requirement is infinitely small
and the total of them is h′(η)). Meanwhile, the valuation densities of all the agents in group η are the
same value of η, namely, the total valuation of all the agents in this group is given by vη = ηh
′(η).
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We refer to the agents in the second continuum of groups by Groups-(
¯
p, p). Recall that based on Eq.
(12), h′ is given by
h′ (η) =
{
f ′−1 (η) if η ∈ [
¯
c, c¯],
1 if η ∈ (c¯,+∞), (62)
Therefore, h′(η) is the maximum units of resource that can be supplied when the marginal cost is η
per unit.
For a given arrival instance Ap with any p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], the social welfares achieved by the optimal
offline algorithm and the α-competitive online algorithm are given as follows:
• Offline: the optimal offline result in hindsight is to allocate h′(p) units of resources to the
requests in the last group, i.e., group p in Groups-(
¯
p, p), and none to all the previous requests.
The optimal social welfare is thus
Soffline(Ap) = ph′(p)− f
(
h′(p)
)
= h(p),
where the second equality comes from the Fenchel duality of h. In fact, if we substitute h′ from
Eq. (62) into the above Soffline(Ap), the equation follows.
• Online: for the α-competitive online algorithm, let y = ψ(η) denote the total resource utilization
after processing the customers in group η ∈ [
¯
p, p], and thus ψ(η) represents the resources allocated
to all the groups of customers in [
¯
p, η]. According to NC1, all the requests in Group-(
¯
p, ω) must
be satisfied. Therefore, we have ψ(
¯
p) = ω, meaning that when η =
¯
p, the total resource utilization
is ω, which equals the total resource requirements of all the requests in Group-(
¯
p, ω). Meanwhile,
ψ(η) is monotonically non-decreasing in η ∈ [
¯
p, p] since the resource allocations are irrevocable.
The social welfare achieved by this online algorithm is thus the total valuation minus the total
cost, namely,
Sonline(A
¯
p) =
¯
pω +
∫ ψ(p)
ψ(
¯
p)
ηd(ψ(η))− f(ψ(p)) =
¯
pω +
∫ p
¯
p
ηψ′(η)dη − f(ψ(p)).
Based on Soffline(Ap) and Sonline(Ap), the online algorithm is α-competitive means that the following
inequality
¯
pω +
∫ p
¯
p
ηψ′(η)dη − f(ψ(p)) ≥ 1
α
h(p) (63)
holds for all p ∈ [
¯
c, p¯]. According to the definition of ψ and ρ¯, we have ψ(p) ≤ ρ¯, ∀p ∈ [
¯
c, p¯], and thus
ψ(p¯) ≤ ρ¯ holds as well. Therefore, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there must
exist a non-decreasing function ψ(p) that satisfies Eq. (61).
B.2 Existence of Strictly-Increasing Allocation Functions and Pricing Functions
Based on NC2 in Theorem 6, Theorem 7 below shows that it is necessary to have a strictly-increasing
segment [ω, ρ¯] for φ.
Theorem 7. Given a convex setup S, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there
must exist a positive value ω ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh(
¯
p)
)
,
¯
ρ] such that the following claims hold:
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• There exists a strictly-increasing function ψ(p) that satisfies{
ψ′(p) = 1α · h
′(p)
p−f ′(ψ(p)) , p ∈ (
¯
p, p¯),
ψ(
¯
p) = ω, ψ(p¯) ≤ ρ¯. (64)
• There exists a strictly-increasing function ϕ(y) that satisfies{
ϕ′(y) = α · ϕ(y)−f ′(y)h′(ϕ(y)) , y ∈ (ω, ρ¯),
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(ρ¯) ≥ p¯. (65)
• ψ(p) and ϕ(y) are inverse to each other, i.e., ψ = ϕ−1 or ϕ = ψ−1.
Proof. We organize our proofs of Eq. (64) and Eq. (65) as follows.
(Proof of Eq. (64)) We first prove the first bullet of Theorem 7, namely, there exists a strictly-
increasing function ψ(p) that satisfies Eq. (64) as long as there exists an α-competitive online algo-
rithm. Note that when ψ(
¯
p) = ω, we can derive based on the left-hand-side of Eq. (63) that
¯
pω +
∫ p
¯
p
ηψ′(η)dη − f(ψ(p)) = pψ(p)− ∫ p
¯
p
ψ(η)dη − f(ψ(p)).
Based on Theorem 6 and the above equivalent transformation, we know that there always exists a
non-decreasing function ψ(p) that satisfies the following inequality
ψ(p) ≥ h(p) + αf(ψ(¯
p))
αp
+
1
p
∫ p
¯
p
(
ψ(η) + f ′
(
ψ(η)
))
dη (66)
and the boundary conditions: {ψ(
¯
p
)
= ω, ψ
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯}. For ease of exposition, let us write the right-
hand-side of Eq. (66) in a more compact form as follows:
ψ(p) ≥ A(p) +B(p)
∫ p
¯
p
Q
(
ψ(η)
)
dη, p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], (67)
where A(p), B(p), and Q(ψ(η)) are given by
A(p) =
h(p) + αf(ψ(
¯
p))
αp
,
B(p) =
1
p
,
Q(ψ(η)) = ψ(η) + f ′(ψ(η)).
It can be observed that Eq. (67) is a nonlinear generalization of the standard Gronwell inequality
[33]. Thus, there must exist a tightest lower bound function ψL(p) such that
ψ(p) ≥ ψL(p), p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯],
namely, ψL is defined to be the tightest lower bound of all the ψ’s that satisfy Eq. (67) with {ψ
(
¯
p
)
=
ω, ψ
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯}. We emphasize that the function ψL is well-defined as there exists at least one non-
decreasing function ψ(p) that satisfies Eq. (67) with {ψ(
¯
p
)
= ω, ψ
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯}. Meanwhile, when Q is
in some special forms (e.g., affine), ψL can be analytically given based on A,B, and Q [33]. Here,
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the nonlinearity of Q makes it difficult (if not impossible) to derive the exact form of ψL. To aid our
following proof, let us define Ωψ by
Ωψ ,
{
ψ
∣∣ψ is a strictly-increasing function that satisfies Eq. (64)}.
The first bullet in Theorem 7 argues that Ωψ is well-defined and non-empty. To prove this, in what
follows we show that ψL ∈ Ωψ, namely, ψL is a strictly-increasing function that satisfies Eq. (67) by
equality and {ψL
(
¯
p
)
= ω, ψL
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯}.
Recall that ψL is defined to be the tightest lower bound of all the ψ’s that satisfy Eq. (67) with
{ψ(
¯
p
)
= ω, ψ
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯}, and thus ψL(p¯) ≤ ρ¯ always holds. On the other hand, if ψL(p¯) ≤ ρ¯ does
not hold, then it is obvious that there will be no solution to Eq. (61) since ψ(p) ≥ ψL(p) > ρ¯ holds
for all p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], which thus contradicts the necessary condition NC2 given by Theorem 6. For this
reason, we only need to prove that ψL(p) is strictly-increasing in p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] and ψL(
¯
p) = ω. In fact, the
definition of ψL indicates that the following equation of ψL(p) holds for all p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯]:
ψL(p) = A(p) +B(p)
∫ p
¯
p
Q
(
ψL(η)
)
dη. (68)
This is because, if there exists any pˆ ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] such that Eq. (68) does not hold at p = pˆ, then we can
always lower the value of ψL(pˆ) to reach the equality and make the smaller value as the new output
of ψL(pˆ). Based on Eq. (68), we can prove that ψL(p) is strictly-increasing in p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯]. Our proof is
based on contradiction and the details are as follows. As illustrated by the dashed line in Fig. 4, if
we assume that ψL is not strictly monotone in p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], then there must exist a point, say p0 ∈ [
¯
p, p¯],
so that ψ′L(p0) = 0. Recall that h
′(p) > 0 holds for all p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] as the conjugate function h(p) is
strictly-convex in p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯]. Thus, we can derive from Eq. (68) that
ψ′L(p) =
1
α
· h
′(p)
p− f ′(ψL(p)) 6= 0, p ∈ [¯
p, p¯],
which contradicts ψ′L(p0) = 0. Therefore, ψL is either strictly-increasing or strictly-decreasing. Note
that our design of ω ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh(
¯
p)
)
,
¯
ρ] guarantees that
¯
p − f ′(ω) > 0. Therefore, based on the
PicardLindelo¨f theorem [3, 35], there always exists a unique strictly-increasing function ψL that satisfies
the following first-order initial value problem (IVP)8:{
ψ′L(p) =
1
α · h
′(p)
p−f ′(ψL(p)) 6= 0, p ∈ (¯
p, p¯),
ψL(
¯
p) = ω.
(69)
As a result, ψL must be strictly-increasing. Recall that ψL(p¯) ≤ ρ¯ always holds, together with Eq.
(69), we can conclude that ψL ∈ Ωψ, which means that Ωψ is well-defined and non-empty. Thus, we
complete the proof of Eq. (64).
Remark 6. Our above proof shows that the tightest lower bound function ψL(p) is strictly-increasing
in p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] and satisfies Eq. (64). If we define similarly that ψU is the tightest upper bound of all
the ψ’s that satisfy Eq. (67) with {ψ(
¯
p
)
= ω, ψ
(
p¯
) ≤ ρ¯}, then we can prove a stronger result: for
any given α ≥ 1, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there exist infinitely-many
strictly-increasing functions that satisfy Eq. (64), unless ψL = ψU since in this case Ωψ is a singleton,
i.e., Ωψ = {ψL}. Geometrically, when α is larger, the shaded area in Fig. 4 will be expanded as
ψU (p¯) − ψL(p¯) becomes larger. In contrast, a smaller α indicates that ψU and ψL are closer to each
other, i.e., ψU (p¯) − ψL(p¯) is smaller, and in the extreme case when ψU = ψL, the corresponding
value of α is the minimum competitive ratio that any online algorithm could possibly achieve. For the
detailed discussion of the optimal/minimum competitive ratio, please refer to the proof of Theorem 3
in Section 6.
8We give a brief overview of first-order IVPs in Appendix E.1 and Appendix E.2.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Ωψ for given
¯
p, p¯, ω, and
¯
ρ. In the figure, ψL and ψU denote the tightest
lower and upper boundaries of Ωψ, respectively.
(Proof of Eq. (65)) Now we are ready to prove Eq. (65). Since ψ(p) is strictly-increasing, the
inverse of ψ(p) is well-defined. Let us denote the inverse of y = ψ(p) by p = ψ−1(y) , ϕ(y). The
derivative of ψ(p) = ϕ−1(p) can be written as
ψ′(p) =
1
ϕ′ (ϕ−1(p))
=
1
ϕ′(y)
. (70)
Substituting Eq. (70) into Eq. (64) leads to the following ODE
1
ϕ′(y)
=
1
α
· h
′(ϕ(y))
ϕ(y)− f ′(y) .
Therefore, we have the following ODE in terms of ϕ:
ϕ′(y) = α · ϕ(y)− f
′(y)
h′
(
ϕ(y)
) , y ∈ (ω, ρ¯),
which is exactly the ODE in Eq. (65). Based on the two boundary conditions of ψ(p) given in Eq.
(61), the BVP in Eq. (65) directly follows. Based on the above proofs of Eq. (64) and Eq. (65), we
thus complete the proof of Theorem 7.
Based on NC1 in Theorem 6 and the two BVPs in Theorem 7, Theorem 2 follows.
C Proof of Corollary 2
The proof is simple and intuitive by following our previous analysis of the ODE with boundary con-
ditions.
(Zero Cost: q = 0) When f(y) = 0, i.e., there is no supply cost, the extended cost function is
given as follows:
f¯(y) =
{
0 if y ∈ [0, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
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Recall that the conjugate function h(p) is given by h(p) = maxy≥0 py − f¯(y) = maxy≥0 Fp(y), which
indicates that h(p) = p,∀p ∈ [0,+∞). Therefore, the BVP given by Eq. (25) can be written as follows:{
ϕ′(y) = α · ϕ(y), y ∈ (ω, ρ¯),
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(1) ≥ p¯.
Based on Eq. (60), we know that ω ≥ 1α . Solving the above ODE leads to the following solution
ϕ(y) = δ · exp (αy) ,
where δ can be any real scalar. Based on the two boundary conditions, to minimize α, we set
δ exp (αω) =
¯
p, δ exp (α) = p¯, α =
1
ω
.
Solving the above equations leads to δ =
¯
p/e, where e denotes the base of the natural logarithm.
Therefore, the final optimal pricing function is
φ∗(y) =
¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω∗),
¯
p · exp (y/ω∗ − 1) if y ∈ [ω∗, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
where ω∗ and α∗ are given by
α∗ = 1 + ln
(
p¯
¯
p
)
, ω∗ =
1
1 + ln
(
p¯/
¯
p
) .
(Linear Cost: q > 0) When f ′(y) = q and q > 0, namely f(y) = qy when y ∈ [0, 1]. The
conjugate function h(p) is given by
h(p) =
{
0 if p ∈ [0, q],
p− q if p ∈ (q,+∞).
Based on Eq. (60), we have
¯
pω − f(ω) ≥ 1α
(
¯
p − f(1)), which thus indicates that ω ≥ 1α . The
differential equation of interest is thus given by{
ϕ(y)− f ′(y) ≥ 1α · ϕ′(y) · h′ (ϕ(y)) ,∀y ∈ (ω, 1),
ϕ(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ(1) = p¯,
which leads to the following general solution: ϕ(y) = δ · exp (αy) + q. Substituting the two boundary
conditions into the general solution leads to ϕ(ω) = δ · exp(αω) + q =
¯
p, ϕ(1) = δeα + q = p¯. To
minimize α, it suffices to set ω = 1/α and thus we have
φ∗(y) =
¯
p if y ∈ [0, ω∗),
(
¯
p− q) · exp (y/ω∗ − 1) + q if y ∈ [ω∗, 1],
+∞ if y ∈ (1,+∞),
where ω∗ and α∗ are given by
α∗ = 1 + ln
(
p¯− q
¯
p− q
)
, ω∗ =
1
1 + ln
(
p¯−q
¯
p−q
) .
Combining the results regarding q = 0 and q > 0, we complete the proof of Corollary 2.
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D Proof of Corollary 3
Based on Theorem 1 and Eq. (32), the worst-case competitive ratio of PMφ satisfies:
• When the final resource utilization ρ ∈ [0, ω], the worst-case competitive ratio is
α1 =
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω)
.
This corresponds to the arrival instance that all agents have the minimum valuation density
¯
p.
• When the final resource utilization ρ = ρ¯ϕ, the worst-case competitive ratio is
α2 =
h(p¯)
¯
pω +
∫ ρ¯ϕ
ω ϕ(y)dy − f (ρ¯ϕ)
.
This corresponds to the worst-case scenario when the first group of agents are all satisfied by
PMφ and all of them obtain zero utilities (i.e., the valuation equals the payment), while the
offline optimal social welfare is to satisfy all the agents in the second group whose valuation
densities are all p¯.
• When the final resource utilization ρ ∈ [ω, ρ¯ϕ), the worst-case competitive ratio is
α3 = max
ρ∈[ω,ρ¯ϕ)
h(ϕ(ρ))
¯
pω +
∫ ρ
ω ϕ(y)dy − f (ρ)
,
which comes from Eq. (32). The rationality of α3 is based on analyzing the competitive ratio of
PMφ under a series of worst-case scenarios constructed in Section 5.2.
Combining the above three cases, we have
α(ω, ϕ) = max{α1, α2, α3}
= max
{
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω)
,
h(p¯)
¯
pω +
∫ ρ¯ϕ
ω ϕ(y)dy − f (ρ¯ϕ)
, max
ρ∈[ω,ρ¯ϕ]
h
(
ϕ(ρ)
)
¯
pω +
∫ ρ
ω ϕ(y)dy − f (ρ)
}
.
We thus complete the proof of Corollary 3. Note that when ϕ(1) ≥ p¯, the second term (i.e., α2) is not
needed as it is contained by α3.
E Proof of Proposition 3
E.1 Background of First-Order Two-Point BVPs
For a better reference, we revisit the two BVPs in Corollary 4 as follows:
BVP1(ω, u, α)
{
ϕ′1(y) = α · ϕ1(y)−f
′(y)
f ′−1(ϕ1(y)) , y ∈ (ω, u);
ϕ1(ω) =
¯
p, ϕ1(u) = c¯,
(71)
BVP2(u, α)
{
ϕ′2(y) = α · (ϕ2(y)− f ′(y)) , y ∈ (u, 1);
ϕ2(u) = c¯, ϕ2(1) ≥ p¯.
(72)
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A solution to the above first-order two-point BVPs is a function ϕ1(y) or ϕ2(y) that satisfies the
corresponding ODE and also the two boundary conditions.
In the field of differential equations, when there is only one additional condition other than the
ODE, the resulting problem is an initial value problem (IVP). For example, the following IVP is
derived from BVP1(ω, u, α) by excluding the first boundary condition:
IVP1(ω, u, α)
{
ϕ′1(y) = α · ϕ1(y)−f
′(y)
f ′−1(ϕ1(y)) , y ∈ (ω, u);
ϕ1(u) = c¯,
(73)
where ϕ1(u) = c¯ is usually termed as the initial condition. We denote the solution to the above
IVP by ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) (if it exists). Meanwhile, we denote the first derivative of ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) w.r.t
y ∈ (ω, u) by ϕ′ivp (y;ω, u, α).
The key to the analysis of IVPs and BVPs is the existence and uniqueness of solutions. For first-
order IVPs, the existence and uniqueness theorem is well understood. In particular, the PicardLindelo¨f
theorem [3, 35] guarantees the unique exsitence of solutions as long as the ODE satisfies a certain
Lipschitz continuity conditions. Meanwhile, there are plenty of iterative methods off-the-shelf that can
solve IVPs numerically. However, for BVPs, there is no general uniqueness and existence theorem. As
argued by [35], it is even non-trivial to obtain numerical solutions for some BVPs in the most basic
two-point case as Eq. (71) and Eq. (72).
Our optimal pricing function design in Theorem 3 relies on the uniqueness and existence property
of first-order two-point BVPs. On the one hand, based on the existence and uniqueness property,
we can prove that there always exists a competitive pricing function as long as the competitive ratio
α satisfies a certain condition. On the other hand, we can prove that there exists no other online
algorithms that can outperform PMφ with a smaller competitive ratio since the corresponding BVP
has no solution.
E.2 Basic Lemmas
Our pricing function design is related to the existence, uniqueness and monotonicity property of
solutions to IVP1(ω, u, α). Note that to simplify the analysis below, we temporarily assume that
ω ∈ [0,
¯
ρ] is a given parameter. Later in our proofs of the existence of Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u), we will
include the discussions of ω as a design variable.
Lemma 1. For each (α, u) ∈ [1,+∞)× (ω, 1], IVP1(ω, u, α) has a unique solution ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) that
is defined over y ∈ [ω, u].
Lemma 1 follows the PicardLindelo¨f theorem for the existence and uniqueness of solutions to IVPs.
We refer the details to [1, 3, 35]. Basically the PicardLindelo¨f theorem guarantees that there always
exists a unique solution to IVP1(ω, u, α), defined on a small neighbourhood of the initial point ϕ(u) = c¯,
as long as the ODE in IVP1(ω, u, α) is Lipschitz continuous within that neighbourhood. Moreover,
this unique solution extends to the whole region of y ∈ [ω, u]. Based on Lemma 1, we can prove the
following Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 2. Given α ≥ 1, ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) is increasing in y ∈ [ω, u] and lower bounded by f ′(y) for all
y ∈ [ω, u].
Proof. We first prove that ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) ≥ f ′(y) holds for all y ∈ [ω, u]. Note that when y = u ∈
(0, 1), we have ϕivp(u;ω, u, α) > f
′(u) and ϕ′ivp(u;ω, u, α) > 0. Therefore, if ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) ≥ f ′(y)
does not hold for all y ∈ [ω, u], then there must exists at least one point within (ω, u), say y0 ∈ (ω, u),
such that ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) > f
′(y) for all y ∈ (y0, u], ϕivp(y0;ω, u, α) = f ′(y0), and ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) <
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f ′(y) for all ω ∈ (y0 − , y0), where  is a small positive value. However, when ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) < f ′(y),
ϕ′ivp(y;ω, u, α) is negative according to the ODE, and thus ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) is decreasing in (y0− , y0).
This means that ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) > ϕivp(y0;ω, u, α) = f
′(y0) > f ′(y) for all y ∈ (y0− , y0), leading to a
contradiction. Therefore, ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) ≥ f ′(y) always holds for all y ∈ [ω, u], and the monotonicity
directly follows.
Lemma 2 guarantees that for any α ≥ 1 and u ∈ (ω, 1), the unique solution to IVP1(ω, u, α)
is a monotone pricing function. Below we give Lemma 3, which states that ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) is also
monotonic in (u, α) ∈ (ω, 1)× [1,+∞).
Lemma 3. ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) is continuous and non-increasing in (u, α) ∈ (ω, 1)× [1,+∞).
Proof. The continuity directly follows since ϕivp (y;ω, u, α) is well defined for all (u, α) ∈ (ω, 1) ×
[1,+∞).
We first prove the monotonicity in u ∈ (ω, 1) by contradiction. Suppose we have u1 ∈ (ω, 1) and
u2 ∈ (ω, 1), and assume w.l.o.g. that u1 > u2, we can prove that ϕivp(y;ω, u1, α) < ϕivp(y;ω, u2, α)
holds for all y ∈ (ω, u2). The idea is that these two functions cannot have any intersection point, since
otherwise the IVP with the same ODE as IVP1(ω, u, α) but with the initial condition defined at the
intersection point will have at least two solutions, namely ϕivp(y;ω, u1, α) and ϕivp(y;ω, u2, α), which
is impossible due to the uniqueness property given by Lemma 1. Note that it is also impossible to
have ϕivp(y;ω, u1, α) > ϕivp(y;ω, u2, α) since if this is the case, then ϕivp(y;ω, u1, α) is not monotonic
in y ∈ (ω, u1). Therefore, when u1 > u2, we always have ϕivp(y;ω, u1, α) < ϕivp(y;ω, u2, α).
We now prove the monotonicity in α ∈ [1,+∞). Suppose we have α1 and α2, and assume w.l.o.g.
that α1 > α2. We need to prove that ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) < ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2) for all y ∈ (ω, u]. Based on
the ODE of (73), when α1 > α2, the derivative of ϕ at y = u satisfies
ϕ′ivp(u;ω, u, α1) > ϕ
′
ivp(u;ω, u, α2).
Therefore, there must exist a small interval on the left-hand-side of u, say [u− , u], where  is a small
positive value, such that ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) < ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) for all y ∈ [u − , u]. This can be easily
proved based on the definition of the derivative, which is omitted for brevity.
Now suppose ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) < ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2) does not hold for all y ∈ [ω, u], then there must
exist an intersection point u0, such that ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) < ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2) when y ∈ (u0, u], and
ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) ≥ ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2) when y ∈ (u0 − , u0], where  is a very small positive value. Now
let us consider two new IVPs with the same initial condition defined at point y = u0, and denote the
unique solutions to these two new IVPs by ϕnew(y;ω, u0, α1) and ϕnew(y;ω, u0, α2), according to the
uniqueness property, we must have
ϕnew(y;ω, u0, α1) = ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1),∀y ∈ (ω, u0),
ϕnew(y;ω, u0, α2) = ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2),∀y ∈ (ω, u0).
Since ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) ≥ ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2) when y ∈ (u0−, u0], which means that we cannot find a small
interval on the left-hand-side of u0, say [u0 − ˆ, u0], such that ϕnew(y;ω, u0, α1) < ϕnew(y;ω, u0, α2).
However, this contradicts with the fact that
ϕ′new(u0;ω, u0, α1) > ϕ
′
new(u0;ω, u0, α2).
Therefore, we have ϕivp(y;ω, u, α1) < ϕivp(y;ω, u, α2) for all y ∈ (ω, u]. We thus complete the proof.
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E.3 Proof of the Existence of Γ1(ω, u)
We now prove the unique existence of a well-defined function Γ1(ω, u) in the first bullet of Proposition
3.
Our proof is based on the idea of “shooting method” in ODE [3, 35]. Here we briefly explain
the intuition. For each given ω ∈ [0,
¯
ρ] and u ∈ (ω, 1), based on the ODE in Eq. (73), when α
approaches infinity, ϕ1(y) must be very close to f(y) when y approaches ω from the right, namely,
ϕ1(ω) approaches f
′(ω). In this case, ϕ1(ω) ≤
¯
p. Similarly, when α is very small, say approaches zero
(our definition of α requires that α ≥ 1, here we purely focus on the numerical analysis of the IVP
given by Eq. (73)), then ϕ1(ω) must be very close to c¯ since ϕ
′
1(y) will be close to 0 and thus ϕ1(y) will
be almost horizontal. In this case, ϕ1(ω) ≥
¯
p. The monotonicity property in Lemma 3 indicates that
there must exist a unique α in between so that ϕ(ω) is exactly equal to
¯
p. In the “shooting method”,
this indicates the value setting of α hits the target of ϕ(ω) =
¯
p. In summary, for a given ω ∈ [0,
¯
ρ] and
u ∈ (ω, 1), there exists a unique α so that the unique solution to the IVP in Eq. (73) is the unique
solution to the BVP in Eq. (71). We thus complete the proof of the existence of α = Γ1(ω, u).
E.4 Proof of the Existence of Γ2(u)
Proving the unique existence of α = Γ2(u) is more straightforward as the ODE in Eq. (72) can be
solved in analytical forms. To be more specific, the general solution can be written as follows:
ϕ2(y) = exp(αy) ·
(∫ y αf ′(η)
exp(αη)
f ′(η)dη + C
)
,
where C is any real constant. Substituting the two boundary conditions into the above general solution
leads to the following
ϕ2(u) = exp(α · u) ·
(∫ u αf ′(η)
exp(αη)
dη + C
)
= c¯,
ϕ2(1) = exp(α · 1) ·
(∫ 1 αf ′(η)
exp(αη)
dη + C
)
≥ p¯,
which thus indicates that ∫ 1
u
αf ′(η)
exp(αη)
dη ≥ p¯
exp(α)
− c¯
exp(uα)
(74)
We can prove that for each given u ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a unique α that satisfies Eq. (74) by
equality as long as p¯ > c¯. The proof is similar to that of α = Γ1(ω, u) as any given setup of p¯ > c¯ will
guarantee the existence of a monotone function ϕ2(y) in the interval [u, 1] with an appropriate setting
of α. Moreover, this α must be unique as otherwise the uniqueness property in Lemma 1 would be
contradicted. Therefore, if we denote this unique α by α = Γ2(u), then we complete the proof of the
existence of Γ2(u). However, note that in the second bullet of Proposition 3, we argue that for any
α ≥ Γ2(u), the BVP in Eq. (72) will have a unique monotone solution. This can be proved by the
monotonicity of ϕ2(y) w.r.t. α, similar to our proof of Lemma 3, and thus we skip the details for
brevity. In summary, for each given u ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a unique solution to BVP2(u, α) as long
as α ≥ Γ2(u). We thus complete the proof of Proposition 3.
F Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of Theorem 5 heavily relies on the monotonicity properties of φ w.r.t ω, u, and α. To achieve
the minimum α, we make the following claims:
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u
α
ω
Γ2(u)
u(ω)
Γ1(ω, u)
α(ω)
Figure 5: Illustration of the unique existence of the intersection point u(ω) between Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u)
for a given ω ∈ (0,
¯
ρ).
• Claim 1: ω must be as small as possible. Since a larger ω will shrink the interval of [ω, 1], and
the value of α must be increased as the overall slope the pricing function will be steeper. For
any α, to minimize the choice of ω, we set
α =
h(
¯
p)
F
¯
p(ω)
or ω = F−1
¯
p
(
1
α
h
(
¯
p
))
.
• Claim 2: for each given ω ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
,
¯
ρ], Γ1(ω, u) is strictly decreasing in u ∈ (ω, 1).
Meanwhile, Γ2(u) is strictly increasing in u ∈ (ω, 1). The proof of the monotonicity of Γ1(ω, u)
and Γ2(u) is elementary based on our analysis in Appendix E above. To visualize the intuition,
Fig. 5 illustrates Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u) w.r.t. u ∈ (ω, 1) for a given ω. We can prove that for any
ω ∈ (0, ρ¯], there exists a unique u(ω) such that Γ1(ω, u(ω)) = Γ2(u(ω)), as illustrated by the
intersection point in Fig. 5. The proof is straightforward by evaluating the values of Γ1(ω, u)
and Γ2(u) at their two boundaries, e.g., Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u) approaches infinity if u approaches ω
and 1, respectively, Therefore, the monotonicity of Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u) indicates that there must
exist a unique intersection point u(ω) in the interval [ω, 1]. To minimize α, we simply choose
u = u(ω) so that α = α(ω) is minimized for a given ω ∈ [ω,
¯
ρ].
Based on the above two claims, to minimize α(ω), we must set ω = F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
. In this case the
unique intersection point between Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u) is the optimal design of u, and the corresponding
α is the minimum competitive ratio, i.e., α∗(S). In summary, the optimal design of ω and u is the
unique solution to the following system of equations
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
= Γ1(ω∗, u∗) = Γ2(u∗).
We thus complete the proof of Theorem 5.
G Remaining Proofs of Theorem 3 in Case-2 and Case-3
In this section, we provide the remaining proofs of Theorem 3 in Case-2 and Case-3.
G.1 Case-2: c < c ≤ p ≤ p
In this case, c¯ ≤
¯
p ≤ p¯ indicates that
¯
ρ = ρ¯ = 1. Meanwhile, there exist no such a resource utilization
threshold u so that φ(u) = c¯, as illustrated in Fig. 1(c). Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we give
the following Corollary 5 which summarizes the sufficient and necessary conditions in Case-2.
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Corollary 5. Given a convex setup S in Case-2, PMφ is IC and α-competitive if there exists a
critical threshold ω ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
, 1] such that φ is given by
φ(y) =
¯
p, if y ∈ [0, ω],
ϕˆ2(y), if y ∈ [ω, 1],
+∞, if y ∈ (1,+∞),
(75)
where ϕˆ2(y) is a solution to the following BVP:
B̂VP2(ω, α)
{
ϕˆ′2(y) = α ·
(
ϕˆ2(y)− f ′(y)
)
, y ∈ (ω, 1);
ϕˆ2(ω) =
¯
p, ϕˆ2(1) ≥ p¯.
(76)
On the other hand, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there must exist a strictly-
increasing solution to B̂VP2(ω, α) for some ω ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
, 1].
Proof. The proof is similar to our previous analysis regarding Corollary 4 in Case-1.
Similar to Proposition 3, we give the following Proposition 4 to show the existence of function
Γˆ2(ω).
Proposition 4. For each given ω ∈ [0, 1), B̂VP2(ω, α) has a unique strictly-increasing solution if and
only if α ≥ Γ̂2(ω), where Γ̂2(ω) satisfies the following equation in variable Γ̂2:∫ 1
ω
Γ̂2f
′(y)
exp
(
yΓ̂2
)dy = p¯
exp
(
Γ̂2
) − ¯p
exp
(
ωΓ̂2
) . (77)
Proof. Eq. (77) is similar to Eq. (46) and thus we omit the proof for brevity.
Based on Proposition 4, we give the following Theorem 8 to show the unique existence of ω∗ as
well as the calculation of α∗(S) in Case-2.
Theorem 8. Given a convex setup S in Case-2, there exists a unique ω∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the
optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) is given by
α∗(S) =
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
= Γ̂2(ω∗), (78)
where ω∗ ∈ [0, 1) is the unique root that satisfies Eq. (78). Meanwhile, PMφ is α∗(S)-competitive if
and only if φ is given by Eq. (75) with (ω, α) = (ω∗, α∗(S)).
Proof. The result follows similarly as Theorem 5.
Note that in Case-2, the calculation of the unique ω∗ is equivalent to finding the unique root to
the following equation∫ 1
ω∗
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
· exp
(
− h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
· y
)
· f ′(y) dy = p¯ · exp
(
− h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
)
−
¯
p · exp
(
− h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
· ω∗
)
.
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G.2 Case-3: c < p ≤ p ≤ c
In this case,
¯
c <
¯
p ≤ p¯ ≤ c¯ indicates that
¯
ρ ≤ ρ¯ ≤ 1. Meanwhile, there exist no such a threshold
u ∈ (0, 1) so that φ(u) = c¯, as illustrated in Fig. 2(d). Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we give
the following Corollary 6 which summarizes the sufficient and necessary conditions in Case-3.
Corollary 6. Given a convex setup S in Case-3, PMφ is IC and α-competitive if there exists a pair
of resource utilization thresholds (ω, ρ) ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
,
¯
ρ]× [ω, ρ¯] such that φ is given by
φ(y) =
¯
p, if z ∈ [0, ω],
ϕˆ1(y), if z ∈ [ω, ρ],
+∞, if z ∈ (ρ, 1],
(79)
where ϕˆ1(y) is a solution to the following BVP:
B̂VP1(ω, ρ, α)
ϕˆ
′
1(y) = α · ϕˆ1(y)−f
′(y)
f ′−1
(
ϕˆ1(y)
) , y ∈ (ω, ρ);
ϕˆ1(ω) =
¯
p, ϕˆ1(ρ) ≥ p¯.
(80)
On the other hand, if there exists an α-competitive online algorithm, then there must exist a strictly-
increasing solution to B̂VP1(ω, ρ, α) for some pair of (ω, ρ) ∈ [F−1
¯
p
(
1
αh
(
¯
p
))
,
¯
ρ]× [ω, ρ¯].
Proof. The proof is similar to our analysis of Theorem 5.
Similar to Proposition 3, we give the following Proposition 5 to show the existence of function
Γˆ1(ω, ρ).
Proposition 5. Given a convex setup S in Case-3, for each given pair of (ω, ρ) ∈ [0,
¯
ρ)×(ω, ρ¯], there
exists a well-defined function Γ̂1(ω, ρ) so that B̂VP1(ω, ρ, α) has a unique strictly-increasing solution
if and only if α ≥ Γ̂1(ω, ρ).
Proof. The result follows the first bullet in Proposition 3.
Based on Proposition 5, we give the following Theorem 9 to show the calculation of α∗(S) in
Case-3.
Theorem 9. Given a convex setup S in Case-3, there exists a unique ω∗ ∈ [0,
¯
ρ] such that the optimal
competitive ratio α∗(S) is given by
α∗(S) =
h
(
¯
p
)
F
¯
p(ω∗)
= Γ̂1 (ω∗, ρ¯) , (81)
where ω∗ is the unique root that satisfies Eq. (81). Meanwhile, PMφ is α∗(S)-competitive if and only
if φ is given by Eq. (79) with (ω, ρ, α) = (ω∗, ρ¯, α∗(S)).
Proof. The proof is similar to our analysis of Theorem 5.
Based on Theorem 5, Theorem 8, and Theorem 9, Theorem 3 follows. We thus complete the proof
of Theorem 3 in all the three cases.
Remark 7. Based on Theorem 5, Theorem 8, and Theorem 9, we conclude that the upper bound of
the optimal pricing function is always equal to the maximum valuation density, namely, φ∗(ρ¯) = p¯.
Note that compared to φ∗(ρ¯) > p¯, by setting φ∗(ρ¯) = p¯ we can have a higher resource utilization level
while still guarantee the competitive ratio of PMφ. The intuition here is that it is always beneficial to
have a higher resource utilization level as long as the resources are sold at the right price.
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H Proof of Corollary 1
The properties of α∗(S) directly follow the monotonicity of Γ1(ω, u) and Γ2(u). We briefly explain
them as follows:
• For a given p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞), we claim that Γ1(ω, u) is strictly decreasing in
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c, p¯]. We use
Case-1 to explain the intuition. A larger
¯
p indicates a smaller value of c¯ −
¯
p, and thus for a
given ω and u, the pricing function ϕ1 can increase from
¯
p to c¯ with a smaller rate. A smaller
increasing rate of ϕ1 indicates that the value of α can be smaller as well. Therefore, Γ1(ω, u) is
decreasing in
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c, p¯]. As we can see from Fig. 5, a smaller Γ1(ω, u) indicates a smaller value
of u(ω) (note that Γ2(u) will not change w.r.t. the increasing of
¯
p), as well as a smaller value
of α(ω), which thus leads to a smaller value of α∗(S) in the end. Therefore, α∗(S) is strictly
decreasing in
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c, p¯] for a given p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞).
• We can prove similarly that α∗(S) is strictly increasing in p¯ ∈ [
¯
p,+∞) for a given
¯
p ∈ (
¯
c,+∞).
We skip the details for brevity.
• Note that
¯
p = p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞) happens only in Case-2 and Case-3. For instance, in Case-2,
¯
p = p¯ ∈ (c¯,+∞) indicates that ϕˆ2(ω∗) = ϕˆ2(1) =
¯
p = p¯, where ϕˆ2 is the unique solution to the
BVP in Eq. (76). We argue that such a solution occurs only when ω∗ = 1 and in this case the
optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) = 1 since both the online and offline strategies are to satisfy
all the request until reaching the total capacity limit. We can prove similarly that in Case-3,
ω∗ =
¯
ρ and α∗(S) = 1 as long as
¯
p = p¯ ∈ (
¯
c, c¯]. Combining the results in both cases, we have
α∗(S) = 1 and ω∗ =
¯
ρ when
¯
p = p¯ ∈ (
¯
c,+∞).
We thus complete the proof of Corollary 1.
I Proof of Theorem 4
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 4, we first give the extension of PMφ in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Posted Price Mechanism (PMφ)
1: Inputs: A given setup S = {ft,
¯
pt, p¯t}∀t∈T and φ = {φt}∀t∈T .
2: Initialize: yˆ
(0)
t = 0 and pˆ
(0)
t = φ(yˆ
(0)
t ) for all t ∈ T .
3: while a new agent n arrives do
4: Supplier publishes the price pˆ
(n−1)
t for t ∈ T .
5: if vn −
∑
t∈Tn r
t
n · φt
(
y
(n−1)
t
)
< 0 then
6: Agent n leaves (i.e., set xˆn = 0)
7: else if yˆ
(n−1)
t + r
t
n > 1 for any t ∈ T then
8: Request n is rejected (i.e., set xˆn = 0)
9: else
10: Request n is satisfied (i.e., set xˆn = 1)
11: Set the payment pˆin by pˆin =
∑
t∈Tn r
t
n · φt
(
y
(n−1)
t
)
.
12: Update the total resource utilization by yˆ
(n)
t = yˆ
(n−1)
t + r
t
n, ∀t ∈ T .
13: Update the price by pˆ
(n)
t = φt
(
yˆ
(n)
t
)
,∀t ∈ T .
14: end if
15: end while
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Based on Algorithm 2, the sufficient conditions of Theorem 4 can be derived based on Proposition
1 as follows. We first prove that there indeed exists an index k ∈ N such that the initial inequality
hold. The major argument is that in the worst-case, each agent may only require resource for a single
time slot, leading to the existence of a critical threshold ωt for each t ∈ T . Specifically, suppose k ∈ N
and after processing all the agents within {1, 2, · · · , k}, we have
Pk =
k∑
n=1
vn −
∑
t∈T
f¯t(yˆ
(k)
t ) =
k∑
n=1
(
γˆn +
∑
t∈T
rtn · φt(y(n−1)t )
)
−
∑
t∈T
f¯t(yˆ
(k)
t ).
The dual objective after processing request k is given by
Dk =
k∑
n=1
γˆn +
∑
t∈T
ht(pˆ
(k)
t ).
Based on the pricing function given by Eq. (38), the initial inequality Pk ≥ 1αtDk leads to the following(
1− 1
αt
) k∑
n=1
γˆn +
∑
t∈T ¯
pt ·
(
k∑
n=1
rtn
)
−
∑
t∈T
f¯t
(
k∑
n=1
rtn
)
≥ 1
αt
∑
t∈T
ht
(
¯
pt
)
.
Since αt ≥ 1 and γˆn ≥ 0, it suffices to have the following inequality for each time slot:
¯
pt ·
(
k∑
n=1
rtn
)
− f¯t
(
k∑
n=1
rtn
)
≥ 1
αt
ht
(
¯
pt
)
. (82)
The above inequality Eq. (82) holds if the following one holds:
¯
ptωt − f¯t (ωt) = F
¯
pt(ωt) ≥
1
αt
ht
(
¯
pt
)
,
where ωt =
∑k
n=1 r
t
n. Meanwhile, for the same reason as the previous basic resource allocation model,
it is obvious that ωt must be less than or equal to
¯
ρt because the selling price must be larger than or
equal to the marginal cost, i.e,. φt(ωt) =
¯
pt ≥ f ′t(ωt). Therefore, Eq. (39) indicates that the initial
inequality Pk ≥ 1αtDk holds for some k ∈N.
We next prove the ordinary differential inequality in Eq. (40). The change in the primal objective
is given as follows:
Pn − Pn−1 = vn −
∑
t∈T
(
f¯t(yˆ
(n)
t )− f¯t(yˆ(n−1)t )
)
= γˆn +
∑
t∈T
φt(yˆ
(n−1)
t )
(
yˆ
(n)
t − yˆ(n−1)t
)
−
∑
t∈T
(
f¯t(yˆ
(n)
t )− f¯t(yˆ(n−1)t )
)
.
The change in the dual objective is given as follows:
Dn −Dn−1 = γˆn +
∑
t∈T
(
ht(pˆ
(n)
t )− ht(pˆ(n−1)t )
)
.
To guarantee that Pn − Pn−1 ≥ 1α (Dn −Dn−1) holds, it is equivalent to having the following(
1− 1
αt
)
γˆn +
∑
t∈T
(
φt(yˆ
(n−1)
t )
(
yˆ
(n)
t − yˆ(n−1)t
)− (f¯t(yˆ(n)t )− f¯t(yˆ(n−1)t )))
≥ 1
αt
∑
t∈T
(
ht(pˆ
(n)
t )− ht(pˆ(n−1)t )
)
,
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where the first term γˆn ≥ 0 always holds. Therefore, if the following inequality holds at each round,
then the incremental inequality holds as well:∑
t∈T
(
φt(yˆ
(n−1)
t )
(
yˆ
(n)
t − yˆ(n−1)t
)− (f¯t(yˆ(n)t )− f¯t(yˆ(n−1)t ))) ≥ 1αt∑
t∈T
(
ht(pˆ
(n)
t )− ht(pˆ(n−1)t )
)
. (83)
To guarantee that Eq. (83) holds, it suffices to have the following per-slot inequality
φt(yˆ
(n−1)
t )
(
yˆ
(n)
t − yˆ(n−1)t
)
−
(
f¯t(yˆ
(n)
t )− f¯t(yˆ(n−1)t )
)
≥ 1
αt
(
ht(pˆ
(n)
t )− ht(pˆ(n−1)t )
)
,
which is equivalent to the following:
φt(yˆ
(n−1)
t )−
f¯t(yˆ
(n)
t )− f¯t(yˆ(n−1)t )
yˆ
(n)
t − yˆ(n−1)t
≥ 1
αt
·
ht
(
φt(yˆ
(n)
t )
)
− ht
(
φt(yˆ
(n−1)
t )
)
φt(yˆ
(n)
t )− φt(yˆ(n−1)t )
· φt(yˆ
(n)
t )− φt(yˆ(n−1)t )
yˆ
(n)
t − yˆ(n−1)t
.
Therefore, we have the following inequality in the differential form:
φt(y)− f¯ ′t(y) ≥
1
αt
· h′t
(
φt(y)
) · φ′t(y), ∀y ∈ [ωt, 1). (84)
This means, if Eq. (84) holds for all y ∈ [ωt, 1), then the incremental inequality holds at each round
for all y ∈ [ωt, 1).
Similar to our previous analysis, we need to guarantee that the incremental inequality holds at
each round for all y ∈ [ωt, 1]. Therefore, we need to consider the boundary condition of φt(y) when
y = 1. First, it is obvious that φt(ωt) =
¯
pt as the pricing function φt must be continuous. Taking
integration of both sides of Eq. (84) leads to∫ ρt
ωt
φt(y)dy − f¯t(ρt) + f¯t(ωt) ≥ 1
αt
(
ht
(
φt(ρt)
)− ht(
¯
pt
))
,
where ρt denotes the final utilization level at time slot t ∈ T . Meanwhile, based on the flat-segment,
we have
¯
ptωt − f¯t(ωt) ≥ 1αtht(¯
pt). Thus, we have
¯
ptωt +
∫ ρt
ωt
φt(y)dy − f¯t(ρt) ≥ 1
αt
ht
(
φt(ρt)
)
,
which is the same as Eq. (57). When ρt = 1, the above equality also holds, and thus we have
¯
ptωt +
∫ 1
ωt
φt(y)dy − f¯t(1) ≥ 1
αt
ht
(
φt(1)
)
.
On the other hand, PMφ is αt-competitive indicates that the following inequality must hold:
¯
ptωt +
∫ 1
ωt
φt(y)dy − f¯t(1) ≥ 1
αt
∑
t∈T
ht(p¯t), (85)
where the right-hand-side represents the optimal social welfare in the offline setting when the resource
at time t has been used up. Note that here the worst-case scenario is different from the single time slot
case. The rationality of Eq. (85) is as follows. When the resource at time t is used up by agents whose
valuation equals the payment, let us assume that there is a follow-up arrival instance which consists of
two groups of agents as follows: i) the first group of agents ask for resource at time t with the maximum
valuation density p¯t, and ii) the second group of agents ask for resources at time t as well as at time tˆ
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with the maximum valuation density p¯tˆ, ∀tˆ ∈ T \{t}. Meanwhile, we assume that the number of agents
in these two groups are large enough so that the total capacity of each time slot can be used up. In the
online setting, the social welfare is given by the left-hand-side of Eq. (85), meaning that the valuation
of the accepted agents are all equal to their payments, while the follow-up agents are all rejected due
to the capacity limit at time t. In comparison, in the offline setting, the optimal social welfare is to
allocate all the capacity at time t to those agents in the follow-up instance whose valuation densities
are p¯t, ∀t ∈ T , as a result, the optimal optimal social welfare in hindsight is
∑
t∈T ht(p¯t), as given by
the right-hand-side of Eq. (85). Therefore, to guarantee that the above Eq. (85) holds, it suffices to
have the following boundary condition: φt(1)− ft(1) ≥
∑
t∈T ht(p¯t) =⇒ φt(1) ≥ p¯t +
∑
tˆ∈T \{t} htˆ(p¯tˆ).
Summarizing our above proofs regarding the critical threshold, the differential inequality and the
boundary conditions, we complete the proof of Theorem 4.
(Impacts of Multiple Time Slots on the Competitive Ratio) Based on the second boundary condition
in Eq. (40), φt(1) follows roughly linearly w.r.t. the total number of time slots. For example, when
we assume p¯t ≥ c¯t for all t ∈ T , then the second boundary condition in Eq. (40) indicates that
φt(1) ≥ p¯t +
∑
tˆ∈T \{t} htˆ(p¯tˆ) =
∑
t∈T p¯t −
∑
tˆ∈T \{t} ftˆ(1). Our previous analysis regarding the basic
model shows that the calculation of the optimal competitive ratio α∗(S) depends on the boundary
condition of φ∗ (i.e., the monotonicity of α∗(S) in Corollary 1). Therefore, in the case with multiple
time slots, the final competitive ratio α = maxt{αt} depends on |T | as well. As we mention in the
conclusion of the paper, it is difficult to analyze the property of α∗(S) w.r.t.
¯
p and p¯. Similarly, here
it is also difficult to analyze the dependency of α on the total number of time slots. We leave this for
future research.
(Necessary Conditions) The necessary conditions in Theorem 2 can also be generalized to consider
the case with multiple time slots. We skip the details for brevity as most of the proofs are similar
to our previous analysis in the paper, except that the worst-case analysis regarding the boundary
conditions should be performed in a different manner, as demonstrated by Eq. (85).
J Computation of ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S)
In this section, we present the algorithms for computing ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S) in Case-1. We skip the
computational details regarding Case-2 and Case-3 for brevity.
We give Algorithm 3 below to show the calculation of Γ1(ω, u) for a given ω and u. We also give
Algorithm 4 to show the calculation of Γ2(u) for a given u. Based on GAMMA1(ω, u) in Algorithm 3 and
GAMMA2(u) in Algorithm 4, Algorithm 5 shows the calculation of ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S) for a given convex
setup S.
We can see that Algorithm 3 performs a bisection search for the unique output of Γ1(ω, u). Note
that  is a constant that is sufficiently small. In both Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, R1 and R2
are two large positive constants that can be initialized appropriately based on the setup S. In line
4 of Algorithm 3, we need to solve the IVP parameterized by ω, u, and α0. We emphasize that
solving IVP(ω, u, α0) in this step is light-weight and various off-the-shelf methods/solvers can be used.
Algorithm 5 searches between [0, 1] for the unique u∗. Based on the unique u∗, the optimal critical
threshold ω∗ can be given by line 5 of Algorithm 5. Recall that in Algorithm 5, F−1
¯
p denotes the
inverse of F
¯
p, which is defined by Eq. (8).
Before ending this section, we give the following remark regarding the implementation of PMφ∗ .
Remark 8. It is worth pointing out that the calculation of φ∗ in a numerical manner should not be
a concern for the online implementation of PMφ∗. On the one hand, our above algorithms shows that
the computation of ω∗, u∗ and α∗(S) can be performed efficiently via various numerical root-finding
methods such as bisection searching. On the other hand (and perhaps more importantly), for a given
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Algorithm 3: GAMMA1(ω, u)
1: Inputs: A given setup S = {f,
¯
p, p¯}, ω, u, and . Set α1 = 1, α2 = R1, and ϕ1(u) = R2.
2: while |ϕ1(u)− c¯| >  do
3: Compute α0 =
α1+α2
2 .
4: Solve the following IVP and obtain the solution ϕ1(y):
IVP(ω, u, α0)
{
ϕ′1(y) = α0 · ϕ1(y)−f
′(y)
f ′−1(ϕ1(y)) , y ∈ (ω, u);
ϕ1(ω) =
¯
p.
5: if ϕ1(u) > c¯ then
6: α2 = α0.
7: else
8: α1 = α0.
9: end if
10: end while
11: Γ1(ω, u) = α0.
12: Outputs: Γ1(ω, u).
Algorithm 4: GAMMA2(u)
1: Inputs: A given setup S = {f,
¯
p, p¯}, u, and . Set α1 = 1, α2 = R1, and GAP = R2.
2: while |GAP | >  do
3: Compute α0 =
α1+α2
2 .
4: Set GAP =
∫ 1
u
α0f ′(y)
exp(yα0)
dy −
(
p¯
exp(α0)
+ c¯exp(uα0)
)
.
5: if GAP > 0 then
6: α2 = α0.
7: else
8: α1 = α0.
9: end if
10: end while
11: Γ2(u) = α0.
12: Outputs: Γ2(u).
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Algorithm 5: Calculation of ω∗, u∗, and α∗(S)
1: Inputs: A given setup S = {f,
¯
p, p¯} and . Set u1 = 0, u2 = 1, and GAP = 1.
2: while |GAP | >  do
3: Compute u∗ = u1+u22 .
4: Γ2(u∗) = GAMMA2(u∗).
5: Set ω∗ = F−1
¯
p
( h(
¯
p)
Γ2(u∗)
)
.
6: Γ1(ω∗, u∗) = GAMMA1(ω∗, u∗).
7: Set GAP = Γ2(u∗)− Γ1(ω∗, u∗).
8: if GAP > 0 then
9: u2 = u∗.
10: else
11: u1 = u∗.
12: end if
13: end while
14: Set α∗(S) = GAMMA1(ω∗, u∗) = GAMMA2(u∗).
15: Outputs: ω∗, u∗, α∗(S).
convex setup S, the parameters α∗(S), ω∗, and u∗ can be computed offline before the start of PMφ∗.
This means, we only need to solve either BVP1(ω∗, u∗, α∗) or BVP2(u∗, α∗) “on-the-fly”, depending on
which segment the total resource utilization level is located.
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